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CORPORA TE STRATEGY AS PLURAL RATIONALITY 
ABSTRACT 
Conflicting model-based prescriptions for strategy are viewed from the 
perspective of the extended general theory of rational decisions. The 
conflicts are re-cast as general meta-rational arguments and this 
perspective yields diagnostics for evaluating strategy-models. There 
follows a quite radical re-formulation of the prescriptive dimensions of 
strategic-management, such that the general theory of rational decisions 
is seen as the latent prescriptive theory of strategy. In "Strategy as 
Rationality" the strategic-entity (individual, group, organization, 
network, etc.) is cast as a plurally-rational agent, with rationality 
informing strategy and vice-versa. Meta-rational and meta-ethical 
arguments then project this new framework into the ethical domain, with the 
stra tegic-enti ty now cast as a moral-agent. The extended framework of 
"Strategy as Moral Philosophy" carries with it further implications for 
prescription in strategic management, whilst is also complements an 
emerging re-integration, at the systemic level, of Economics with Ethics. 
The new conceptual framework is then applied to: (i) the strategic 
mystery of corporate investment decisions with sunk costs, involving the 
set of backward-looking rationalities, (ii) competitor-analysis and 
strategic-intelligence, involving a view of other strategic entities as 
plurally-rational agents, and (iii) capital-budgeting methodologies. The 
latter application prescribes modification and confinement of some 
traditional decision-rules for strategic investments. 
(i) 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis, which consists of six major chapters, is in two sections. 
Section one (chapters 1, 2 & 3) represents several stages of theory 
development, in the area of strategic management, but with particular 
emphasis on its prescriptive dimensions. Specifically, a new conceptual 
framework is set out and developed. Section Two (chapters 4, 5 & 6) is more 
oriented towards some enduring strategic mysteries, seeking out their 
solutions within this new framework. 
In the first major chapter, "Meta-rationality and strategy", the question 
of conflicting model-based strategy prescriptions is viewed from the 
perspective of recent developments in the general theory of rational 
decisions. 
involving 
structured 
The first stage of a wider conceptual framework is then proposed, 
the concept of decision-function-rationality and a partially 
set of multiple rationalities, with their meta-rational 
relationships. Conflicting model-based prescriptions are then recast as 
conflicts between alternative forms of rationality. This preliminary 
framework is then operationalised, in the sense of deriving a methodology 
that involves a structured set of diagnostic questions. These questions 
target the analytic models and heuristic processes routinely used in 
strategic decision analysis. This framework also offers a means to identify 
situations where there is only limited scope for further technical analysis 
in the strategy formulation process. Some implications for strategic 
decision-support-systems are then outlined, with a brief discussion of some 
comparable theories and techniques. 
Chapter two then takes "meta-rationality & strategy" as a vantage point, 
from which to adopt a quite radical new perspective on the entire concept of 
strategic management itself. In "Strategy as Rationality", the general theory 
of rational decisions is seen as the latent prescriptive theory of strategic 
management, with the strategic entity re-cast as a plurally- rational- agent. 
This new perspective explains and justifies the prescriptive dimension of 
strategic management theory, whilst it also at the same time places 
rationalistic inquiry on a par with empirical approaches in strategy 
research. In "Strategy as Rationality" strategic thinking is seen to 
extend across the entire set of the plural rationalities, according to the 
various contexts of a "perceived mul tiverse", to use a term suggested for 
this very purpose by Milan Zeleny (1992). 
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In the new framework, the plural rationalities form a structured set 
which is shown' to be isomorphic to a structured set of strategy concepts. 
An explicit isomorphic correpondence then carries with it several 
implications for theory and research in strategy ... and in rationality. 
Meta-rational arguments are invoked once again with several examples of 
rationality informing strategy: optimal strategy, expressive strategy, 
not-for-profi t-commi tments etc. All such strategies are rational, yet 
fundamentally different. This framework is also made operational as a new 
technique of strategic inquiry, the SCIO technique, which is simply a set of 
questions shaped around plural rationality, intended for meta-cognitive 
inqiry and evoking a particular form of wisdom. 
Chapter three, "Strategy as Moral philosophy" again builds upon this, its 
immediate predecessor. If strategy and rationality are both broadly concerned 
with problems of action, decision and behaviour set in socio-economic 
contexts, then so too is Ethics and the broad discipline of Moral-Philosophy. 
This simple observation leads directly to an even more general framework that 
sees the theory of strategic behaviour as nothing other than a theory of 
Ethics, with the organisation now recast as a moral-agent. This effectively 
integrates strategy with ethics, a step that, according to Georges Kervern of 
the Union Des Assurances in Paris (1991), is potentially "une therapeutic -
la moins violente possible - des maladies de la societe". Plural rationality 
and ethics are now linked directly to prescription in strategic management, 
so that issues in ethical theory, such as choosing rationalities also become 
central mysteries for strategy formulation and strategy research. This new 
approach simply complements, at the level of the strategic entity, an 
emerging synthesis of Ethics with Economics at the aggregate or 
public-policy level. 
Chapter 4 (section 2) then picks up one particular theme first introduced 
in chapters 2 & 3, namely the mystery of strategy in the sunk cost context, 
or strategic re-considerations. This widely studled problem is now seen to be 
equivalent (isomorphic) to that confronting a plurally-rational individual 
who cannot be certain about the future but is re-considering a 
partially-implemented' personal plan. Normative, descriptive and prescriptive 
dimensions of a re-formulated generic sunk cost problem are re-interpreted, 
with particular emphasis on sunk cost factors, i.e. factors recognised within 
the normative theories as representing the latencies or carryovers inherent 
in past strategies. A simple new inquiry procedure for strategic 
re-considerations, SCrO-BAK, is then derived from the set of 
backward-looking rationalities. This, in turn, represents but one very 
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specific way in which the general theory of rationali ty can now inform or 
enrich the· general theory of strategy. The conflicts and ambiguities 
surrounding the principle of ignoring sunk costs in normative theory are then 
re-cast as meta-rational arguments involving the backward-looking versus 
foward-looking rationalities, this time drawing upon the framework of chapter 
one. 
Chapter five continues the orientation towards context-specific 
applications, with a particular focus upon the strategic intelligence 
function, or competitor analysis. The chapter outlines some new 
methodologies for competitive and strategic analysis that are based directly 
upon the conceptual frameworks set out earlier. In the first part, a device 
is proposed for screening general theories and models of competition, with 
respect to their potential value for business intelligence analysis. The 
second part revisIts the various diagnostic questions outlined earlier in 
chapter one, referring these to the competitor analysis context. Then, yet 
another variant of the scra technique is set out (based upon "strategy as 
rationali ty") this time as a technique intended for competitor analysis, 
rather than a broader reflective strategic analysis. Some 40 questions are 
derived from the plural rationalities as a prescribed focus for this type of 
intelligence activity. 
Finally, chapter six explores the implications of "Strategy as 
Rationality" for the use of traditional capital budgeting techniques. As in 
chapter four, above, the convergent meta-theories of modelling, forecasting, 
systems and rationality together are seen as determining the various specific 
roles and limitations of DCF techniques. They particularly show that NPV 
decision-rules should not be used to prescribe investment versus non 
investment strategies, but that it could be rational (in the relevant 
strong-instrumental sense) to apply DCF techniques after the firm's 
investment strategy has emerged, in order to select amongst known capital 
assets, or to solve some types of financing problem. The latter is a quite 
different problem-type, or problem domain. Therefore, the use of DCF 
decision-rules in the secondary phase of investment decision-making requires 
some reformulated· domain-specific decision-rules that are quite different 
from the usual model-based equilibrium returns criteria. Thus, strategic and 
financial analysis may now be comfortably reconciled, not only by using 
meta-rational arguments (as in chapter one) but also, in this final chapter, 
by confining the different forms of analysis to seperate problem-domains. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
META-RATIONALITY AND STRATEGY 
Appeared as: SINGER AE Meta-Rationality and Strategy OMEGA: Int. J. of 
Mgmt Sci., 19. 2/3, pp.l01-112. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts between alternative strategic and financial appraisals of 
investment opportunities are quite common in practice. For example, in a 
recent case-study (Shank et al, 1988) a bicycle manufacturer was considering 
an opportunity to greatly improve turnover by supplying a retail-chain with a 
large private-label inventory at discounted prices. Financial analysis 
yielded a large positive NPV and residual income, prescribing a "go" 
decision; yet basic strategy principles, such as market segmentation and 
competitive analysis, led directly to a "no-go" prescription for the same 
proposal. 
In that particular case, several specific issues were identified as 
seperating the alternative forms of decision-analysis. These included: (i) 
the deliberate omission of some factors from financial forecasts, (ii) the 
seemingly unethical treatment of the firm's traditional retailers, (iii) the 
possibili ty of traditional dealerships subsequently asking for a similar 
discount deal, and (iv) the potential organisational implications of such a 
major shift in business strategy. This paper examines these and other similar 
issues, in the context of a broader theoretical investigation of conflicting 
prescriptions for strategic investments. 
Specifically, a conceptual framework is outlined and is used to produce 
a structured set of diagnostic questions to help resolve such conflicts, and 
to identify problem-situations where there is only limited scope for further 
technical analysis. In essence, this is achieved by recasting conflicting 
prescriptions as manifestations of deeply-rooted but partly resolvable 
conflicts between alternative forms of rationality. Some implications of the 
framework are traced for strategic-level decision-support-systems (DSS) , 
where a similar issue of conflicting alternative approaches has frequently 
surfaced. A final section of the paper positions the framework and the 
derived diagnostics relative to alternative strategic planning methodologies 
and strategy research-paradigms. 
Within the framework, strategy prescriptions are analysed at three 
levels: at the first level are the various alternative decision-models and 
techniques themselves, together with the questions that frequently arise in 
practice (and in the theoretical literature) about their inter-relationships. 
At the second level are the multiple forms of rationality that could be 
displayed by a strategic-level rational-agent, or manager. These mul tiple 
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forms of rationality can be placed in correspondence with the various 
al terna ti ve models and strategic principles. At the third level are the 
various inter-relationships between the multiple forms of rationality. The 
latter (meta-rational) relationships have already been intensively 
investigated, with results that have substantive implications for strategy 
prescriptions. 
The framework is operationalised by specifying diagnostics that evoke 
these metarational relationships and hence bring to the surface the deeper 
philosophical roots of conflicting model-based strategy prescriptions. 
Furthermore, by identifying the incomplete or problematic metarational 
arguments, the methodology identifies situations where further strategic 
and financial analysis is unlikely to bear much fruit in practice. 
2. COMPONENTS OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. 
The general concept of conflicting model-based prescriptions for 
strategic decisions is illustrated in Figure 1. In the context of special 
investment opportunities, or a routine strategic review, various investment 
al ternatives {S, .... , S} might be considered (e. g., status quo, capacity 
1 J 
expansion, foreign acquisition, divestment, a major R&D effort, increased 
marketing expenditure, etc.). To faciliate appraisals, planners could use 
various financial analysis models {M , ..... ,M } such 
1 L 
as the 
capital-asset-pricing-model (CAPM) with probabilistic multi-period 
returns-forecasts, financial options-valuation models, or other quantitative 
techniques. They might also employ strategic (qualitative or heuristic) 
planning guidelines {M', ...... , M '} such as the Boston Consulting Group 
1 n 
(BCG) portfolio matrices, or "PIMS" principles, or, in some cases, refer to 
established policy guidelines for the business (such as "internal 
development, not. acquisi tions"). 
When more than one of these techniques, guidelines and principles are 
applied to the same investment proposal, conflicting prescriptions can easily 
resul t. Accordingly, questions have often been asked about whether such 
conflicts can always be resolved, or how model-based techniques and other 
principles might ultimately be reconciled; but these questions have not been 
fully answered (e. g. Myers, 1984; Pinches, 1982, in finance; Bettis, 1983; 
Bowman, .1980; Cooke, 1985 and Wensley, 1981, in strategy). The framework 
proposed in this paper represents an attempt to make some progress on these 
issues. 
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FIGURE 1. 
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The framework comprises the various investment and planning models 
themselves, as well as an extended notion of a rational model-user, or owner 
of the strategic problem. Specifically, the framework combines the concepts 
of: (i) multiple forms of rationality, (ii) decision-function-rationalities 
(e.g., Morecroft, 1983); and (iii) meta-rational arguments (e.g., Jungerman, 
1983). Thus, the framework draws together several recent developments in the 
general theory of rational decisions, in the particular context of strategic 
decision making, representing an overall approach that is normative (i. e. 
"what should be done") and prescriptive (i. e. "how can the framework help?") 
rather than descriptive. 
The idea of extending the concept of a rational agent in strategic 
decisions has often been foreshadowed in the planning-related disciplines 
(e.g. Pinches, 1982; Jungerman, 1983; Michael, 1989 and Nooteboom, 1989). At 
the same time, multiple rationalities {R, ..... ,R } have been identified and 
1 m 
employed in several studies of decision-making (e.g. Binmore, 1987; Cherniak, 
1986; Elster, 1979; Hamlin, 1986; March, 1978; Sen, 1977; and Simon, 1987, to 
mention but a few). Figure 2 presents a taxonomy of these forms, which are 
briefly described in the next section. 
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3. FORMS OF RATIONALITY AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
The taxonomy in Figure 2 is used to organise the overview, which first 
considers "calculated" versus "systemic" forms, then "means-rationalities", 
"belief-rationalities" and "ends-rationalities", at the same time indicating 
some linkages to strategic planning issues. Whilst an attempt is made to 
minimise the use of unecessary jargon, several specialised terms are used 
here essentially as labels, deliberately evoking richer and fuller 
descriptions from within the various source references. 
Calculated and Systemic Rationalities 
First, a basic distinction between calculated versus systemic forms has 
been drawn (March, 1978). Calculated rationality embraces the whole process 
of goal-setting, belief-verification and discovery of suitable means for 
achievement of those goals. By contrast, systemic forms like selective 
rationali ty involve historical references. Under a criterion of selective 
rationality, a decision to act is deemed rational if similar acts in similar 
circumstances have, in the past, enabled survival and development of the 
decision-making agent. Similarly, Posterior rationality refers to the pusuit 
of goals that have themselves emerged from past experiences; whilst adaptive 
rationality refers to the use of decision-making rules derived in that way. 
Thus, for example, a corporate strategic decision reflecting a corporate 
tradi tion of internal development, in the face of an acquisition proposal 
having high (forecast) profitability, could be adaptively rational, even if 
not rational in the calculated sense. Conflicts involving corporate 
traditions versus financial appraisals could then be understood in terms of 
the relationships between these forms of rationality. 
Means Rationalities 
Economic theory has traditionally been concerned with the 
means-rationality of the decision-making agent (model-user or problem-owner) 
and particularly with substantive forms, where rationality is defined with 
r~ference to outcomes, like the utilities in some finance-theoretic models. 
These substantive forms may be distinguished from procedural forms involving 
rule-governed processes in decision making. (Procedural forms and adaptive 
forms have some similarities, as indicated in Figure 2.) An emphasis on 
process rather than outcome also distinguishes imperfect from perfect forms. 
The latter assume total knowledge of the relevant environment (omniscience) 
and outcomes, whilst imperfect forms emphasise procedures that help overcome 
the decision maker's recognised limitations. 
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Bounded rationality is 
imperfect rationality (Hamlin, 
one particularly richly-described form of 
1986). Bounded rationality has been widely 
interpreted (Scwenk, 1984; Simon, 1987) both in terms of individual cognitive 
processes (limited search and attention, cognitive heuristics, satisficing, 
etc. ) and 
information, 
criteria, etc. 
their metaphorical organisational couterparts (costs of 
problem identification, procedural rules, acceptabili ty 
Many strategic planning aids or heuristics merely assist the 
decision maker in structuring limited relevant knowledge, so they implicitly 
assume bounded rationality, or something less than the perfect rationality of 
the model user. In contrast, applications of models like the 
capital-asset-pricing-model to strategic investment decisions implicitly 
assume SUbstantive or perfect rationality, with particular, known goals. 
Weakness-of-will is another imperfect form (Hamlin, 1986) that accomodates 
the possible instability of goals over time, with the consequent rationality 
of binding precommi tments, as in the mythical behaviour of Ulysses' who 
deliberately bound himself to his ship's mast (Elster, 1979). With this 
concept of rationality, a strategic investment could be deemed rational if it 
were considered to constrain future possible changes of goal. 
Belief Rationalities 
Some cases of conflict in decision making might be traced to 
straightfoward disagreements over the facts. These are rooted in the question 
of the objectivity of beliefs, which is also the subject of various forms of 
belief-rationality. Evidence shows that contrasting beliefs often involve 
parametric versus strategic rationality (Einhorn et ai, 1982; Elster, 1979). 
The former entails failure to recognise environmental (e. g., stakeholder) 
responsiveness to the agent's actions, or the misperception of the 
controllability (Langer, 1975) of various factors. In a planning context, 
misperceptions sometimes occur concerning factors like the ability to 
influence legislation, or concerning the causal nature of known statistical 
relationships like the ROI - market share link. 
Another common and more general source of conflicting prescriptions 
involving beliefs, is the unintentional overlooking of important factors in 
appraisals. The activation of (at least some) relevant beliefs, or knowledge, 
has been identified as a requirement for minimal rationality (Cherniak, 
1986). Therefore, this particular form of rationality is implicit in 
decision-making techniques that involve checklists of relevant factors, 
assumptions-surfacing and testing (Mason et ai, 1981), or "brainstorming" 
approaches, etc. 
Ends Rationalities 
Finally, concerning the definition of rational goals or ends in decision 
making, the distinction between self-interest (egoism) versus extended forms 
(1. e. others' interests) and the further distinction between sympathy and 
commitments, is also relevant to a rational strategic analysis. 
Rational-sympathy is where concern for others directly effects one's own 
welfare, as in the stakeholder approach. Commitments, by contrast, can 
involve the concept of counterpreferential choices (Sen, 1977) where utility 
is deliberately and rationally sacrificed for other purposes, even after 
allowing for any utility associated with psychological empathy. These forms 
of rationality could be reflected in rational managerial decisions involving 
self-sacrifice and commitments. 
9 
4. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Having briefly identified and classified various forms of rationality the 
next step in constructing the conceptual framework is to make explicit the 
correpondence between strategic decision models or principles,and their 
particular implicit forms of rationality, using the concept of "the 
decision-function-rationality (DFR) of a model" (Morecroft, 1983). 
Decision Function Rationalities 
The DFR of any given decision-model is the particular implied form of 
rationality displayed by the model user. Thus, for example, the DFR of the 
CAPM applied to strategic investment appraisal, is perfect or substantive 
rationality (with particular known goals). Although Morecroft introduced the 
term "DFR" in the context of bounded versus perfect forms of rationality, the 
fundamental concept of a mapping having models or principles as its domain, 
with forms of rationality as its range, may be extended. It is generally 
possible to place any given model, technique, or corporate policy principle 
(e. g., "technological leadership at all costs", "we should investment in 
social programmes") in correspondence with a particular implicit and 
identifiable form (or forms) of rationality in decision making (Figure 3). 
Several examples of this correspondence are offered in the subsequent section 
on operationalisation of the conceptual framework. 
Metarationality 
As suggested earlier, once the DFRs are identified, the relationship 
between any given prescriptions or techniques may then be characterised in 
terms of the philosophical arguments and mathematical results that represent 
attempts to place the corresponding forms of rationality relative to one 
another (Hamlin, 1986; Jungerman, 1983). These have been called 
"meta-rational arguments" (Jungerman, 1983). 
Depending on the particular forms of rationality identified in a given 
case of conflicting prescriptions, finding or constructing a metarational 
argument may be relatively easy (as in the case of bounded versus perfect 
forms) or relatively difficult. as in the .case of placing strategic beliefs 
within substantive rationality (game theory). In addition to bounded versus 
perfect forms, other relatively easy metarational arguments involve sympathy 
and self-interest, precommitment and perfect forms, and to some extent 
(indicated later) beliefs about controllability and causality. Harder cases 
include some further aspects of beliefs about causality and strategic 
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interdependence, rational commitments, systemic versus calculated forms, and 
non-consequentialist moral principles (i.e. meta-ethics). Other metarational 
arguments, involving any two given forms of ratlonallty, are often structured 
around these canonical arguments. 
FIGURE 3. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTING PRESCRIPTIONS 
(e.g.CAPM) 
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or 
Incomplete 
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The "difficulty" of a metarationalargument need not be precisely defined 
for present purposes, but is generally determined by the existence of 
paradoxes, infinite regresses, disputed definitions, context effects, 
learning, or other currently unresolved philosophical arguments and empirical 
findings about rationality itself. 
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This distinction between the "easier" versus "harder" (or relatively 
complete versus incomplete) metarational arguments is the final component of 
the proposed theoretical framework. This distinction corresponds, via the OFR 
mapping, to having relatively favourable versus unfavourable prospects for 
reconciling prescriptions through further model-based analysis. In cases 
where "easier" arguments apply to the relevant OFRs, further analysis, 
information search, or the refinement of heuristics is prescribed by the 
framework (as in Metaforecasting research, Makridakis, 1988). However, where 
conflicts correspond via OFR to the harder metarational arguments, there are 
some more fundamental and problematic decision theoretic issues involved. 
Therefore, for these cases, further analysis in practice is unlikely to 
resolve the conflict nor reconcile the models. These harder cases also 
suggest some limitations of model-based OSS for rational strategic planning, 
with some specific loci for an intuitive or judgemental contribution from the 
model-user (e.g.. predicting competitors' strategic moves, incorporating 
ethical issues, corporate traditions, cultures, into a strategic analysis). 
These are explored further in the remaining sections. 
5. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
The rather abstract represent ion of conflicting strategy prescriptions in 
terms of meta-rational relationships actually yields a practical methodology 
for decision analysts, involving a set of diagnostic questions for resolving 
conflicts or for challenging assumptions. The desirability of creating such 
sets of "penetrating" questions to accompany any formal analysis has been 
argued elsewhere (e.g. Fischoff et ai, 1984). Within the present framework, 
a set of simple diagnostic questions (Table 1) emerge naturally and may be 
used to evoke the canonical metarational arguments, enabling easy 
identification of the relevant one(s), for any given case. Suitable 
directions for reconciling the prescriptions are then indicated. The same 
approach may also be used simply to qualify any particular model-based 
prescription. 
The introductory case about the bicycle manufacturer, together with other 
examples of strategic issues, are now used to illustrate this methodology. 
The illustrations are presented with reference to each of the canonical 
metarational arguments, in turn. 
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TABLE 1. DIAGNOSTICS EVOKING META-RATIONAL ARGUMENTS 
To resolve conflicting prescriptions or qualify financial appraisals, 
consider: 
Diagnostic evokes a 
Metarational Argument 
Concerning: 
.. --~---------........ .,.-----------------------.. ----------------.. -------------.. ----------.. --~--... -------.. ----------------------------------------_ .. _---------_ .... ----------_ .. _-----_. 
Q1. ARE (VARIOUS FACTORS) INCORPORATED INTO FORECASTS OF 
KEY-PERfORMANCE-PARAMETERS (ROI, NPV etc.)? 
[e.g., Factors such as cannibalism of product lines, salesforce 
motivation, etc. might be overlooked in forecasts of cashflows.) 
Q2. ARE (VARIOUS FACTORS) CONSIDERED BEFORE OR AFTER THE 
STRATEGIC DECISION? 
[e.g., Factors such as the cost of severance payments in plant 
relocation decisions might be deliberately considered as 
"tactical") 
Q3. ARE THE (HEURISTIC) RULES APPROPRIATE IN THIS CONTEXT? 
[e.g., Funds from "cash-cows" might best be used to retire debt. 
This conflicts with one heuristic planning prescription) 
Q4. WHICH CAUSAL OR STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED? 
[e.g., In forecasting ROI, has the statistical relationship with 
market-share been considered?) 
Q5. ARE STAKEHOlDER'S INTERESTS AND REACTIONS CONSIDERED? 
[e.g., Plant closures can effect he regional economy and 
hence the likely growth of other portfolio businesses.) 
Q6. IS THE INVESTMENT CONSTRUED AND EVALUATED AS A PRECOMMITMENT? 
[e.g., An investment in R&D might be a deliberate attempt 
to pre-empt future deviation from current goals.) 
Q7. HAVE ANY IMPORTANT FACTORS BEEN OVERLOOKED 
[e.g., The response of traditional dealerships could be 
overlooked in a move to supply a retail chain.) 
Q8. WHICH fACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AS CONTROlLABLE, OR 
CAPABLE OF BEING INFLUENCED? 
[e.g., Government action on import tariffs.) 
Q9. ARE CONDITIONAL FORECASTS USED? 
[e.g., Forecast ROI allowing for competitor's likely 
responses to the particular proposal.) 
Q10. HAVE MUlTILATERAL (GAME THEORETIC) SITUATIONS BEEN IDENTIFIED? 
[e.g., simultaneous capacity expansion decisions) 
Q11. IS THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS BASED ON MANAGERIAL SELF-INTEREST 
(VS. A GENUINE COMMITMENT TO 'SHAREHOlDERVALUE") 
[e.g., use of a market-share goal despite expected adverse 
impact on shareholder value) 
Q12. IS THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS BASED ON SOME (OTHER) COMMITMENT? 
[e.g., maintaining employment) 
Q13. IS (CORPORATE) TRADITION OR CULTURE A FACTOR? 
[e.g., an established tradition of internal development 
vs. acquisitions) 
Q14. ARE NON-CONSEQUENTIAlIST ETHICAL PRINCIPLES INVOlVED? 
[e.g., a duty to avoid harming other, if possible) 
Q15. ARE SUBJECTIVE PROBABIlITIES APPROPRIATE FOR THIS PROBLEM? 
[e.g., probability of an event in a social system) 
Q16. DO SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES (IF USED) REFLECT SUFFICIENT 
KNOWLEDGE? 
[e.g., opinion-based probabilistic inflation forecasts) 
Q17. HAVE APPROPRIATE TECHNIQUES BEEN USED TO ASSESS THE 
RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION? 
[e.g., the probability that information about a competitor 
is "true") 
13 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
EXTENDED RATIONALITY 
(SYMPATHy) 
WEAKNESS OF WILL 
and PRECOMMITMENT 
MINIMAL RATIONALITY 
BELIEF RATIONALITIES 
STRATEGIC BELIEFS 
(MUlTI LATERALITY) 
EXTENDED RATIONALITY 
(COMMITMENT) 
SYSTEMIC FORMS 
MORAL PRINCIPLES 
(DEONTOlOGY) 
PROBABILISTIC BELIEFS 
TRUTH-VALUES 
Bounded versus Perfect Forms 
Some of the factors that were explicitly considered in the strategic 
analysis for the bicycle manufacturer were deliberately omitted from the 
financial analysis, 
effort to quantify 
specif ically because it was considered not worth the 
them. One such factor was the possibility that 
tradi tional dealers might ask for a special price, similar to the large 
retailer. In this instance, the conflict with financial analysis can be 
traced to a decision not to attempt to quantify what is at least partly 
quantifiable. There is a corresponding metarational argument linking bounded 
versus perfect forms, that concerns the costs (disutilities) of the 
information search and processing that would be needed to achieve 
(hypothetical) perfect rationality. 
The same metarational argument applies to many other cases of conflict 
involving planning heuristics, since these are usually capable, at some cost, 
of being at least partly reconciled with financial appraisals through further 
analysis. For example, the BeG portfolio planning heuristic which prescribes 
investment in "high growth markets where competitive position is strong" may, 
in principle, be reconciled with financial analysis simply by reflecting 
those same product-market characteristics in the projected cashflow stream; 
but this sort of forecasting is notoriously unreliable and rarely attempted 
in practice (e. g. Marsh et ai, 1988, pl03). Similarly, PIMS results might 
also be viewed as crude (conditional) profi tabili ty forecasting devices, 
(e. g., "if we increase marketing expenditure in this situation then we can 
expect higher ROL" etc.) 
Accordingly, diagnostics Ql, Q2, Q3 and Q4 (Table 1) are designed to 
reflect the underlying metarational argument for cases like these, and to 
indicate appropriate steps toward resolving the conflicts. Ql refers to 
adjustments to forecasts to allow for factors often not reflected in 
historical data, such as cannabilism of product lines, salesforce 
motivations, competitor reactions, etc. Q2 refers to a deliberate 
distinction between strategic versus tactical considerations, such as the 
ignoring of likely severance payments in plant-relocation decisions. Q3 
refers. to the need for care in specifying context when considering the use of 
planning heuristics. For example, one strategic planning aid suggests using 
funds from "cash-cow" businesses wi thin a corporate portfolio, to finance 
"Question Marks". Yet this could be hard to justify where the corporation is 
over-leveraged so that debt-retirement has a high present value. In a 
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similar spirit, Q4 invites examination of any causal or statistical 
relationships used in the strategic analysis (like ROI and market share) to 
check that they are relevant to the particular case. 
Sympathy versus Self-Interest 
In the bicycle case, it was suggested that the traditional dealers would 
be potentially disadvantaged by a proposal to go private-label. This was 
described as an "ethical issue" within the strategic analysis. Yet, concerns 
for this stakeholder group might simply be a prudent regard for the likely 
impact (on the bicycle manufacturer) of the dealer's reactions. Since 
managerial self-interest is normally tied in with that of other stakeholder 
groups (through incentives) this is an example of sympathy (Sen, 1977) or 
enlightened self-interest. Similar considerations often arise in strategic 
decisions, for example, where proposed plant-closures are thought likely to 
impact local economies to the point of damaging related businesses. 
In principle, the resolution of such conflicts also lies in a more 
thorough analysis. Attempts have been made to represent stakeholders 
directly within an extended finance-theoretic model (Cornell et al, 1987). 
However, there are other aspects of extended rationality in strategic 
decision making, such as commitments (Sen, 1977), that may not be captured by 
these models (commitments are considered below). The various metarational 
arguments involving extended forms may be evoked in practice by Q5, referring 
to stakeholder interests and reactions. 
Perfect versus Precommitment Forms 
As an example of precommi tment in strategic analysis, a decision-maker 
might approve a long-term research budget because it is considered likely to 
deter possible future deviations, from a mission that is currently seen as 
worthwhile. This unconventional principle for investment decisions has 
precommitment as its DFR. The metarational argument linking precommitments 
to perfect ra tionali ty involves the notion of a decision-maker trying to 
forecast or "guess" his future goals and preferences (March, 1978) and then 
calculating implications for current choice-utilities. Q6, which refers to 
the possibly desirable binding effect of a strategic option, evokes this 
argument. 
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Rational Beliefs and Controllability 
The issue, discussed earlier, of "the current dealers possibly asking for 
a similar deal" to the large retailer, may be considered again with reference 
to belief-rationalities. First, including such aspects as part of a strategic 
analysis but omitting them from a financial analysis could simply reflect an 
effort to ensure that important factors are not overlooked. This, in turn, 
corresponds to the idea in minimal rationality (Cherniak, 1986) of accessing 
relevant knowledge, or of drawing appropriate inferences in decision making. 
This aspect of rationality may be evoked by a simple diagnostic about 
important factors, Q7. Second, the above event and its impact could be 
assessed in terms of subjective probabilities, or it might be controlled or 
influenced through other actions. Thus a preliminary approach to handling 
these issues involves further analysis using judgements of controllability, 
Q8, and conditional forecasts, Q9. The corresponding metarational argument 
involves adjustment of beliefs, to accomodate at least some aspects of 
strategic interdependence and controllability, more objectively. 
Strategic Beliefs and Perfect Means 
This is one of the harder cases. There have been various at tempts to 
develop models that incorporate competitors' reactions into cashflow or 
profit forecasts for NPV calculations (e.g. Myers, 1988; Singer et al, 1990). 
However, there has been no empirically tested, reliable methodologies for 
cashflow forecasting in strategic contexts (Doktor et al, 1988: MacIntyre, 
1984; Michael 1989). The corresponding metarational arguments, linking 
strategic beliefs with perfect rationality encounter many unresolved 
difficulties involving infinite recursions, computational limits and the 
multiple solutions of game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Binmore, 1987). The 
difficulty of the metarational arguments in these case suggests that further 
analysis would be of only limited use in practice. 
Ql0 reflects these arguments. As a preliminary step towards resolving 
related conflicts, planners could seperately identify: (i) relevant 
"parametric factors" like RDI and inflation, that are normally not 
condi tional on corporate actions, which could be forecast using various 
models (ii) "semi-strategic factors" like competitors' subsequent reactions 
to a proposed move (as in meta-games) for which conditional forecasts might 
be appropriate, (iii) "pure strategic factors" that are truly multilateral, 
as in simultaneous capacity-expansion decisions by two or more players, for 
which other approaches could be needed. 
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Different Commitments 
This is another harder case,· Sen's (1977) concept of a rational 
commitment identifies a potential for more fundamental, idealogical conflicts 
between financial and strategic analyses, perhaps seen most clearly l.n 
capital budgeting for not-for-profit organisations. Specifically, this could 
occur where conflicting prescriptions arise from different goals (or sets of 
goals) but where the sympathy argument does not pertain. A normative 
resolution would require some principle for ranking goals in strategic 
decisions. That is, an "ideal" or "meta preference" would be needed. But 
none has ever been established unequivocally for individual decisions nor for 
corporate policy. Actual examples of management policies corresponding to 
unconventional corporate goal priorities are: (i) A commitment to become the 
market leader, regardless of financial cost (e.g., "Cola wars"), (ii) A 
commitment to preserve employment of existing personnel, and to make 
investment decisions accordingly. (This practice has been followed at times 
by some Japanese companies) and (iii) A commitment by governments to military 
defence, or disease prevention, etc., regardless of cost. In these cases, 
even if a carefully calculated, expected NPV turned out to be large and 
negative, a committed decision maker could still approve the investment and 
lay claim to a form of rationality. Qll and Q12 are simple diagnostics for 
identifying (but not necessarily resolving) such fundamental conflicts. 
Systemic Intelligence versus Calculated Rationality 
Returning again to the bicycle case, one of the major strategic issues 
for the manufacturer was expressed as: "Going 'private label' is a strategic 
shift; what are the organisational implications .. ?". This strategic issue 
raises the question of the possibility of accounting for organisational 
traditions, cultures and structures in financial forecasts, for capital 
budgeting appraisals. 
This issue frequently surfaces in the context of appraising strategic 
acquisitions, where positive-NPV acquisition proposals are sometimes rejected 
on the grounds of a corporate tradition of internal development. Yet this 
might still be rational, in a particular sense. The metarational arguments 
linking systemic with calculated forms are difficult and incomplete, 
therefore dounts remain about the rationality status of the "tradition" 
argument. Whilst financial forecasts might allow for additional costs of 
implementation due to cultural mismatches, these techniques make no reference 
to the historical source of the various goals and principles involved in 
17 
defining cultures; yet some knowledge or appreciation of that source is the 
essence of systemic intelligence (March, 1978). Thus, treating traditions or 
cultural changes purely as a financial forecasting problem in strategy 
evaluation, omits what might be an important ingredient of rationality. Q13 
could be used to identify this possible source of conflict; but again without 
promising any eventual resolution, because of the difficulty of the 
corresponding metarational arguments. 
Non-Consequentialist Ethics 
The ethical issue of the position of the traditional dealers, mentioned 
earlier, might be interpreted instead as one involving particular moral 
duties, obligations, or other ethical principles. Formalising these notions 
and transforming them into consequentialist rational principles is another 
long-standing and unresolved theoretical problem. So, where conflicts arise 
from the evaluation of strategies relative to deontological moral principles 
(e. g., "Avoid harming others, if possible", "Fulfill moral obligations", 
etc.) these cannot be resolved easily through further analysis in practice. 
Hence Q14 identifies another source of relatively intractible conflict (Hunt 
et ai, 1986; Singer et ai, 1987). 
Probabilities, Information and Beliefs 
Finally, there are some additional relevant issues, involving 
applications of probability theory, that are interwoven with some of the 
above metarational arguments. Subjective probability estimates for events in 
social systems generally have been critically contrasted with the case of 
physical systems (e.g. MacIntyre, 1984). Techniques for eliciting subjective 
probabili ty estimates for strategic deCision-support usually do not make 
reference to the cognitive mechanisms nor the level of knowledge underpinning 
those subjective estimates. This suggests that in strategic applications of 
finance-theoretic models such as the CAPM, any probability values used could 
be subject to cognitive bias, may not reflect adequate knowledge, and ma~ 
not have been correctly revised (in the Bayesian sense) to eliminate 
potential suprise (Binmore, 1987). Q15 and Q16 refer to these possible 
sources of weakness involving rationality and probability in model-based 
analyses. Finally, there remains the issue of how to account for the 
source-reliabili ty, credibility or truth-value of the items of information 
used to formulate prescriptions [2], [40]. Diagnostic Q17 reflects the fact 
that conflicting prescriptions might arise in practice from inappropriate 
handling of credibility. 
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Swmnary 
Diagnostics (Q1 Q17) may be used to evoke various canonical 
metarational arguments. Where easier metarational arguments apply, technical 
improvements and further analysis are appropriate for improving decision 
quali ty (along the lines of metaforecasting research). Where harder or 
incomplete metarational arguments apply, however, the conflicting 
prescriptions are symptoms of a more fundamental or unresolved 
decision-theoretic problem, so that a satisfactory resolution in practice, 
through further technical analysis alone, is unlikely. 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC-LEVEL DSS 
The issue of alternative and conflicting model-based approaches to 
strategic investment analysis has also frequently surfaced in the specialised 
DSS literature. For example, a recent review (Finlay et al, 1989) contrasts 
"extrapolatory MIS" such as spreadsheets (which are commonly linked to the 
use of NPV criteria) with Management Intelligence Systems (MINTS). The 
latter involve the use of formal planning models, scenario generation and 
techniques for structuring and organising information, much of which cannot 
easily be incorporated into a spreadsheet financial analysis of a strategic 
option. To date, intelligent systems have sought to support the modes of 
thought with which user feels comfortable, rather than force a particular 
form of rationality upon the user. 
However, no normative theoretical basis has been offered to justify this 
emergent philosophy of strategic decision-support. So far, the Ii terature 
describing the evolution of DSS for strategic planning has tended to focus on 
technical issues and experiences with particular models and systems (e. g. 
Oral, 1986; Rockart et al, 1988) but not on a comprehensive theoretical 
framework emcompassing both the system and the user. The present framework 
provides a ready-made but largely unrecognised normative underpinning for 
current practices. It also points to some specific loci for system-user's 
judgements concerning strategic goals and means, as outlined in the following 
sections. 
Strategic Goals 
Meta-rational arguments involving ends-rationalities suggest that 
different goals cannot be ranked by the system, with reference to any 
definitive higher-level rational ideal. Thus, according to the framework, a 
DSS should not seek to impose a particular goal on users, but could instead 
19 
help user(s) to consider or reconsider their own goals more carefully. 
Reports on actual experiences to date with implementing strategic-level DSS 
fit well with this particular prescription. Goal-specification (RGI, Market 
share, Competitiveness, serving a particular stakeholder, etc.) has always in 
fact been the purview of the executives themselves, whilst consensus about 
goals has normally been a prerequisite to DSS effectiveness. The conceptual 
framework would predict a continuation of this aspect of DSS design and 
implementation. 
Strategic Means 
Arguments about means-rationalities (minimal, bounded, and procedural 
forms, etc.) suggest that a primary role of strategic-level DSS should be to 
overcome cognitive limitations of the user rather than optimisation of 
outcomes based on forecasts. Put differently, the role of the DSS should be 
to sharpen-up the users' mental models. 
More specifically, the framework prescribes that a DSS should be designed 
in order to (i) facilitate a re-examination of the causal and statistical 
relationships understood by the user, (ii) detect and eliminate inconsistent 
beliefs of the user, (iii) facilite more appropriate inferences by the user, 
and (iv) locate and activate more relevant knowledge, as ways of improving 
user-rationality. This prescription, of course, also fits very well with what 
has been learnt to date from actual experiences with DSS. Examples are the 
use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process to detect inconsistencies in 
quantitative judgements, the use of semantic networks to expose 
non-sequitors, the development of models for measuring competitiveness in 
terms of actual and potential achievement throughout the organisation, and in 
the development of Expert Systems. None of these approaches to strategic 
level DSS design involve optimisation based on conditional forecasts, as in 
the MIS-spreadsheet approach. The proposed conceptual framework again 
predicts a continuation of current trends. 
User-centered intuitive tasks 
Finally, the framework also points to some specific issues in a strategic 
analysis for which at least some user-centred analysis is prescribed, 
involving intuition and judgement (i. e. "r ight-mindedness" to use a term 
suggested by Singer, 1981) rather than purely model-based analysis. These 
issues correspond to the harder metarational arguments and involve inter alia 
(i) predictions of competitors' strategic moves (ii) consideration of 
organisational traditions and cultures (iii) consideration of user(s) duties 
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and obligations (iv) anticipation of the value of some special strategic 
options like creating a "window" (v) assessing the reliability or truth value 
of a particular item of intelligence information. 
7. DISCUSSION AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Previous treatments of the issue of conflicting prescriptions have been 
quite varied. Such conflicts have been considered paradoxical (e.g. Bowman, 
1980; Wensley, 1981) and as a technical challenge (e.g. Myers, 1988; 
Pinches, 1982) but they have also been interpreted as manifestations of 
fundamental philosophical dualisms (Nooteboom, 1989) and even as desirable 
phenomena, in terms of their impact on organisational decision-making 
procedures (Mason et al, 1981). The present approach directly responds to 
the former using the language of the latter. When conflicts occur in 
practice, they can offer a window of opportunity for improving decision 
procedures, since they draw attention to the fallibility of any particular 
technique (model, theory or world-view). They can provide the psychological 
motivation as well as the political justification for digging more deeply 
into a strategic problem. 
The conceptual framework and proposed methodology is one of several tools 
available to facilitate this sort of "digging". Companion methodologies such 
as "strategic choice" (Friend et al, 1987) "cognitive mapping" (Eden et al, 
1979) and "social decision analysis" (Howard, 1975) to name but a few, could 
more readily bring out the detailed perceived content of a given strategic 
problem, possibly fostering commitment to a negotiated solution. In contrast, 
the diagnostic questions of the present methodology target the analytic 
models and heuristic processes used in decision analysis (e.g., by 
identifying scope for further technical analysis, or particular sources of 
irreducible doubts) Therefore, whilst the proposed diagnostics are rather 
shallow with respect to the content of any given strategic problem, they are 
relatively deep and focussed with respect to their roots in general 
meta-rational relationships. 
The overall approach could also yield a theoretical payoff. At the very 
least, it could serve to draw attention to some potentially important 
relationships that are often ignored or de-emphasised in the current 
strategy, DSS and MS-OR literatures. Although a linkage between conflicting 
model-based prescriptions and metarationality has been recognised before 
(e. g. Morecroft, 1983) the wider scope and potential for linking multiple 
rationalities to strategic decisions has not yet been fully explored. 
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The approach might also be useful as an adjunct to contemporary 
empirical programmes, that are investigating relationships between 
alternative strategy research paradigms (e.g. Schwenk, 1988). The conceptual 
framework might contribute, or act as a catalyst, to theory development in 
this area simply by placing meta-rational arguments (which link alternative 
forms of rationality) alongside empirical interface research programmes 
(which link alternative paradigms of decision-making). Put differently. the 
latter empirical programmes have a rationalistic counterpart that is 
currently receiving little attention in the strategy Ii terature. Equally, 
contemporary empirical strategic-decision research might promote new insights 
into what it means to be rational. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STRA TEGY AS RATIONALITY 
Appeared as: SINGER AE Strategy as rationality Human Systems Management, 
11, 1, 1992, pp7-22. (With editorial commentary) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has often been asked whether theories of individual rationality also 
apply to firms and organizations (e.g., Allison, 1971; Bryman, 1984; Levi, 
1986). Organizational theorists and philosophers have tended to answer this 
question in the negative, thereby rejecting the notion of collective or 
corporate rational agency (e. g., Brunsson, 1982; Pennings, 1985; Elster, 
1986). For various reasons, to be discussed shortly, this idea has been 
described as profoundly misleading, irrational, or one that "does not even 
get off the ground" (Elster, 1986). 
Yet, rather similar notions of collective agency have a distinguished 
place in the general history of socio-economic ideas. In Plato's Republic, 
for example, the individual was often used as a metaphor for the nation or 
state; later Hobbes used the term "sovreign" generically, to refer both to 
individuals and to parliament. Later still, the neo-classical economists 
boldly followed suit, affording homogeneous treatment to individuals, 
households and firms, as actors in economic models. 
Morever, several elements of rational-agency persist quite tenaciously 
within contemporary paradigms of strategic management and managerial 
planning. For example, in a review paper, Hogarth & Makridakis (1981) 
commented on the many "uncanny" parallels between cognitive dimensions of 
rationali ty and modern strategic planning and forecasting concepts. More 
generally, it has been noted (e. g., Bryman, 1984) that an exclusion of 
rationali ty concepts from management theory appears premature, so long as 
rationality itself remains an active field of enquiry. In addition, Singer 
(1991) commented upon some apparent parallels between problems of strategic 
analysis and general theories of rationality. The present paper develops the 
latter theme in a much more radical fashion, arguing that concepts of 
individual rationality and organizational strategy have now reached a 
critical point of convergence, or mutual confluence. 
Plural rationality 
Perspectives that have rejected notions of collective or corporate 
rational agency have all focussed rather narrowly on specified forms of 
rationality, such as the hypothetical egoist-optimiser of neo-classical 
economics (e.g. ,Sen, 1977). Accordingly, in the following section, 
re-interpretations of "rationality" are put in place as the generic defence 
of a revised rational agency concept. Once the- major anti-agency critiques 
are sidestepped or neutralised, the way is then open for elaborating on a 
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concept of the firm as a plurally-rational-agent. Rational-agency in 
strategic management then re-emerges in good shape, but like the mythical 
Hydra, with multiple heads in place of one or two. 
Over thirty distinctive conceptions or forms of individual rationality 
may now be identified within the social, economic, political and cognitive 
sciences. These forms of rationality are outlined, together with source 
references, in section 3 and tables 1-7 of the present paper. With these 
considered collectively, as a set of rationalities, it is possible to 
construct a mapping or isomorphism between core concepts of organizational 
strategy and the plural rationality-set. This isomorphism, with the 
associated concept of corporate rational agency, carries some substantial 
implications for management theory, research and practice. 
First, the general theory of rationality becomes identified as the 
latent and often-sought prescriptive theory of organizational strategy (e.g., 
Freeman, 1984) Next, rationalistic enquiry is placed directly alongside 
empirical strategy research, forming a very respectable and traditional 
partnership in the creation of knowledge. These developments are discussed in 
section 3 of the paper. Finally, in section 4, it is noted that. the 
isomorphism re-casts many of the conflicts and paradoxes of strategic 
management as meta-rational relationships (cf. Singer, 1991). There is a 
large literature on the latter, which can be brought to bear on the former, 
offering new insights or partial solutions to mysteries of strategy and 
problems of rationality. 
2. RESURRECTING AGENCY 
Traditionally, objections to corporate rational-agency have revolved 
around such considerations as informational and cognitive limitations, 
Arrow's social-choice theorem, General Systems Theory and alternative 
political-process perspectives on strategy. Now, however, reinterpretation of 
"rationality" has emerged as a generic defence against all of these lines of 
attack, as follows: 
( i) Cognit i ve 1 imit s. The neo-classical economic model has often been 
criticised for its implicit assumption of omniscience, or perfect rationality 
of the firm. Yet Simon's concept of bounded rationality (an imperfect form 
involving auto-recognition of limitations) manifestly captures individuals 
and organisations as possible agents (e.g. Simon, 1987; Hogarth and 
Makridakis, 1981; Schwenk, 1984). This particular form of rationality has 
been interpreted almost ab initio as applying both to individuals and to 
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firms; i.e. as a quite general property of cognitive systems. For example, 
both types of agent can be (and often have been) described as having 
attentional limits, some modest capacity for calculation and displaying 
satisficing behavior that is mediated by the application of heuristic rules. 
Thus the organization that is the subject of strategic management theory is 
at least a boundedly rational agent. 
(ii) Arrow's theorem. In addition to impicit omniscience, mainstream 
Economic models of rational choice have also upheld well-defined 
preference-orderings as the sine qua non of rationality. However, Arrow's 
(1963) theorem proves that it is not possible to combine the preferences of 
several individuals into a single, well-defined collective preference 
structure. This is an obstacle for collective agency. However, Levi (1988) 
has now constructed an alternative theory of rational choice that does not 
rest upon preference-consistency. Quite the contrary, in fact: Levi's form 
of rationality specifically accomodates unresolved value-conflicts within the 
agent. Thus, inconsistency of preferences, or value-conflict, has becomes a 
starting point for more realistic models of individual rationality, rather 
than the coup de grace for collective agency. 
(iii) General Systems Theory: Re-defined rationality of another sort can be 
invoked to counter yet another line of attack on agency, rooted in General 
Systems Theory. According to Ackoff and Emery (1972) the existence of 
purposeful subsystems in organizations but not individuals undermines 
metaphors between the two. This argument can now be turned on its 
(metaphorical!) head. New theories of rationality (e.g., Elster, 1986) now 
hold that rational individuals do have autonomous psychological subsystems 
(i. e "multiple selves"). Thus instead of using the narrowly-rational 
individual as a metaphor for the firm, in economic theories, complex 
organizations are being offered as metaphors for the individual, in 
psychological models. Thus the Hydra returns, with one more element of 
congruence between rationality and strategy. 
(iv) The political process model. Power and authority have traditionally 
been considered as alternatives to rationality in social explanations. For 
example, Allison's (1971) political process model was proposed as an 
alternative to the neo-classical rational-actor model of the firm. Now, 
admit ting politics no longer entails outright denial of rationality, as 
technical-rational conceptions steadily give 
rationali ty. 
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way to new forms of 



The elements of ~ and their images in S are listed in Tables 1-7, which 
are organized as follows: 1. Belief-rationalities # managerial-perspectives 
and expectations; 2. Means-rationalities # strategic decision processes; 3. 
Ends-rationali ties # corporate objectives and missions; 4. Action 
rationali ties # logical incrementalism; 5. Systemic rationalities # 
historical contexts; 6. Rational-ethics # corporate moral agency; 7. 
Interactive rationality # predicting or diagnosing strategy. 
Next, inter-relationships within the strategy-set S (which are frequently 
the subject of direct empirical investigation) are mapped onto meta-rational 
relationships, in ~. For example, just as STAKEHOLDERS-AS-CONSTRAINTS 
(Ansoff, 1965) --is a form of -- organizational goal-structure, so, in a 
corresponding sense, RATIONAL-SYMPATHY (Sen, 1977) --is a form of--
ends-rationality. Some other examples of strategy # rationality 
correspondences are outlined in tables 1-7 and these are briefly discussed 
below. 
Strategy as rationality 
As the above example illustrates, the isomorphism identifies particular 
strategic management concepts with corresponding forms of rationality and 
vice-versa. Over thirty such correspondences are set out in Tables 1-7. 
Rather than review all of these terms and correspondences in the space of one 
chapter, the following few are singled out as perhaps especially noteworthy. 
To start with, Mintzberg's (1987) "5 P's of Strategy" each correspond to 
distinctive forms of rationality, as follows: (i) PLANS # calculated 
rationality, (calculation of consequences) (ii) PERSPECTIVES # 
substantive-belief rationalities (core mental constructs, attitudes) , (ii) 
PLOYS ~ strategic rationality (gaming), (iv) POSITION ~ expressive 
rationality (communicative action, signalling) (v) PATTERN # interactive 
rationality ("in the eye of the beholder"). 
In addition, (vi) LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM in planning ~ "praxis" or 
action-rationality, (vii) The use of EXTRAPOLATORY FORECASTS in planning # 
extensive belief-rationality in decision-making, (viii) DIALECTICAL INQUIRY 
methodology ~ minimal-rationality, (ix) INTENDED versus REALISED strategy ~ 
excess-of-will in rational choice. Other ~ ~ S correspondences, together with 
a set of key references from which the terms are sourced, are set out in the 
Tables 1-7 and in Figures 1 & 2. In sum, it has now become qui te apparent 
that the language and concepts of strategic management very closely parallel 
those of the plural rationalities. In a sense, strategy and rationality have 
even become one and the same. 
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Table 1. 
BELIEF-RATIONALITIES # PERSPECTIVES, EXPECTATIONS 
RATIONALITIES 
BELIEF, COGNITIVE 
substantive 
epistemic 
STRATEGIC 
PARAMETRIC 
EXTENSIVE 
SCIENTIFIC 
INTENSIVE 
OPEN 
PERFECT 
OMNISCIENT 
STRONG 
MINIMAL 
belief 
# STRATEGIES 
PERSPECTIVES 
expectations 
COMPETITORS 
STAKEHOLDERS 
ploys 
MYOPIC PLANS 
EXTRAPOLATION 
historic data 
MODEL-BASED 
EXPECTATIONS 
CRITICAL 
APPROACH 
COMPLETE 
FORESIGHT 
AST 
brainstorming 
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COMMENTS 
Objectivity, validity, realism of 
beliefs and expectations. 
SIMON 1987, MINTZBERG, 1987 
Expectations 
competitor 
interactions. 
take 
and 
BINMORE 1987, PORTER 1980 
into account 
stakeholder 
Myopic planns, simple capital 
budgeting forecasts. 
ELSTER 1986, ARGENT1 1980 
Expectations are extrapolations of 
historic data. 
WALLISER 1989, MAKRIDAKIS, 1988 
A search for truth. Expectations 
based on formalised relationships. 
GARFINKEL 1967, FISCHOFF &GOITEN 1984 
Thorough error correction; ex post 
managerial reviews. 
POPPER 1989 
A hypothetical ideal of full 
knowledge; prescience. Linked with 
optimisation as means. 
SIMON 1987 
Weakest behavioural requirements for 
a cognitive agent. activation of some 
beliefs, detection of some 
inconsistencies, as in AST. 
CHERNIAK 1986, MASON & MITROFF 1981 
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Table 2. 
MEANS-RATIONALITIES # STRATEGIC DECISION PROCESSES 
RATIONALITI ES 
MEANS 
INSTRUMENTAL 
Zweickrationalitat 
MINIMAL 
inference 
PERFECT, 
STRONG 
INTENSIVE 
IMPERFECT, 
PROCEDURAL, 
WEAK 
POSTPONEMENT 
PRECOMMITMENT 
weakness of will 
self-control 
ADAPTIVE 
BOUNDED 
and QUASI-
COGNITVE 
SELECTIVE (2) 
Marginal, 
RatcheL 
STRATEGIES 
MEANS-ENDS 
PLANNING LOGIC 
COPE, DI, DA 
OPTIMISATION 
MODEL-BASED 
STRATEGY-
SELECTION 
PROCESS, RULES 
ACCEPTIBILITY 
STRATEGIC DELAY 
flexibili ty 
options-maintenance 
irreversible moves 
public commitments 
ADAPTIVE-SEARCH 
PLANNING METHOD 
experiential-
learning 
BOUNDED 
and QUASI-
ORGANISATIONAL 
X-efficiencey 
Capabilities, 
Potential, 
Persistence. 
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COMf1ENTS 
Select goals, find means, 
current beliefs. 
given 
WEBER 1947, ARGENT! 1980 
Making some appropriate 
from activated beliefs. 
techniques that facilitate 
and inference. 
inferences 
Planning 
activation 
CHERNIAK 1986, MASON & MITROFF 1981 
A calculation of hypothetical optimuM 
Assumes omniscience. SIMON 1987 
Explicit model-based 
selection, e.g. CAPM, ICM. 
WALLISER 1989, ORAL 1986 
strategy 
Response to self-recognition of 
cognitive limitations. Bounded 
rationality is one form. 
HAMLIN 1986, SIMON 1987 
Delaying actions until situation is 
clearer. Similar to policy of 
flexibility, options-maintenance. 
RAWLS 1972, AAKER & MASCERENHAS 1984 
Response to goal-uncertainty 
(ambiguity). Pre-empt future goal 
change with binding action now. 
THALER et al 1981, MARCH 1978 
Iterative application of decision 
heuristics, as information becomes 
available. Formalisation yields 
robust convergence to optima. 
Repetition of template approach with 
refined options. 
FLEURBAY 1988, ANSOFF 1987 
Efficient allocation of cognitive 
resources. Selective attention, 
satisficing, heuristics. Cognitive 
and organisational interpretations. 
Quasi-rationaily refers to systematic 
(persistent, widespread) response 
patterns in individual choice 
experiments. 
HOGARTH &MAKRIDAKIS 1981, THALER 1985 
Rationality as pressure-constraint 
tradeoff. Economic theory of X 
-efficiency. Motivation, capabilities 
of agent considered. "Ratchet" refers 
to status-quo preference. 
LEIBENSTEIN SCWHENK 1990. 
Table 3. 
ENDS-RATIONALITIES ~ CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 
RATIONALITIES ~ STRATEGIES 
ENDS, VALUE, 
SUBSTANTIVE(2) 
Wertrat ional Hat 
SELF-INTEREST 
EGOISM 
EXTENDED 
SYMPATHY 
COMMITMENT 
(altruism) 
Goal Ambiguity 
DELIBERATIVE 
EXPRESSIVE 
(authenticity) 
OBJECTIVES, 
GOALS 
SHAREHOLDER-
WEALTH with 
mgt. incentives 
STAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH 
STAKEHOLDERS 
AS CONSTRAINTS 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
SERVICE ETHOS 
Value-uncertainty 
in planning 
FORMULATING 
OBJECTIVES 
reflection 
POLICY DIALOGUE 
as process 
COMMENTS 
Some goals (preferences, values) are 
rational, others are not. 
WEBER 1947, RAWLS 1972 
Own-preference satisfaction (utility 
maximisation) in specified market 
context formally yields 
Pareto-optimality. Basis of 
finance-theoretic prescriptions for 
value-creation strategies. 
ARROW &HAHN 1971, HALEY &SCHALL 1979 
It is rational to have goals other 
than a narrow self-interest. 
SIMON 1964, FREEMAN 1984 
Prudential regard for other's 
interests. The view that satisfying 
stakeholders constrains shareholder 
value-creation. 
SEN 1977, ANSOFF 1965 
Genuine and possibly altruistic 
commitment (i.e. counterpreferential 
choice, utility loss). Service 
ethos, not-for-profit mission. 
SEN 1977, FREEMAN 1984 
Uncertainty or doubt about goals 
(preferences, values). Absence of 
ideal or meta-preference. Value 
-uncertainty (UV) in strategic 
planning. 
MARCH 1978, FRIEND & HICKLING 1987 
Reflecting on own-preferences to 
reduce ambiguity. Policy dialogue, 
establishing goals. 
RAWLS 1972, QUINN 1977 
Active sense of self-management , or 
authenticity, achieved through the 
process of ambiguity reduction. 
Existentialism. Analogous to 
continuous policy dialogue, Ringi 
method of participative corporate 
decisions. HARGREAVES-HEAP 1988, PUCIK 
& HATVANI 1983. 
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Table 4. 
ACTION RATIONAITIES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR 
RATIONALITIES ~ STRATEGIES COMMENTS 
ACTION-rat. 
praxeology 
practical-rat. 
EXPRESSIVE (2) 
Communicative-
action 
Table 5. 
SYSTEMIC 
POSTERIOR 
retrospective 
SELECTIVE 
LOGICAL 
INCREMENTALISM 
SIGNALS, 
SYMBOLIC ACTS, 
POSITION 
Rational action, 
implementing a theory, 
Selective attention to 
process. 
praxeology: 
or strategy. 
content and 
BRUNNSON 1982, GLADSTEIN & QUINN 1985 
Actions are primarily symbolic, not 
instrumental. Establish and reinforce 
identity or reputation. e.g. finding 
and defending a niche. 
HARGREAVES-HEAP 1988, MINTZBERG, 1987 
SYSTEMIC RATIONALITIES AND HISTORIC PROCESSES 
"FORW'ARD-IN-
REVERSE" 
capabili ties 
IMPLICIT GOALS, 
EMERGENT VISION 
SURVIVAL, 
GROW'TH-TO-
OPTIMUM. 
ecological-
models 
Knowledge and behavioural rules 
accumulate over time. Goals emerge. 
Rationality is historical. 
MARCH 1978, HAYES 1985 
Goals (values, preferences) flow from 
actions and their consequences 
(deliberation, cognitive dissonance). 
Goals are not ex ante; strategic 
vision emerges from achievements. 
MARCH 1978, HAYES 1985 
Behavioural rules, tradi tions, 
validated by survival and growth of 
the agent, as in ecological models of 
organisational strategy. 
MARCH 1978, BETTON & DESS 1985 
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Table 6. 
RATIONALITIES 
UTILITARIANISM 
CONTRACTARIANISM 
DEONTOLOGY 
Table 7. 
RATIONAL-ETHICS AND CORPORATE MORAL-AGENCY 
STRATEGIES 
SOCIAL COST-
BENEFIT-
ANALYSIS 
FAIRNESS-GOALS, 
RIGHTS-POLICIES 
STRATEGIC DUTY 
COMMENTS 
It is rational and ethical to seek 
and produce "the greatest good for 
the greatest number". Social 
cost-benefit analysis. 
MILL (1962), PREST & TURVEY 1965 
It is rational and ethical to act 
with and to promote fairness and 
justice. Corporate policies to 
stakeholders should be based on fair 
treatment. 
RAWLS 1972, FREEMAN 1984 
Performance of duties and respecting 
rights is paramount in 
rational-ethical; behaviour. The 
corporation is "a guest in society". 
KANT (1948), GOODPASTER 1988. 
INTERACTIVE VIEW PREDICTING, DIAGNOSING STRATEGY 
INTERACTIVE 
observer 
PATTERN 
emergent 
34 
Rationality and strategy are both 
in the eye of the beholder. Strategy 
is an observed pattern in a stream of 
decisions. 
ACKOFF 1983, MINTZBERG 1987 
3. PLURAL-RATIONALITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
This isomorphism between a rationality-set, IR, and a strategy-set, S 
sheds new light upon the strategic management process, particularly its 
prescriptive dimensions. It also contributes something to the general theory 
of rationality. As a practical bonus, the implied view of the firm as a 
plurally-rational-agent yields some new techniques for strategic analysis. 
These developments are outlined in the remainder of the paper. 
Theoretical perspectives 
(i) Agency. The strategic-entity entity (i. e. player, firm, organization, 
dominant coalition, planning unit, CEO, "brain of the firm" etc.) is 
reconstructed as a plurally-rational-agent. The concepts of 
plural-rationality and strategic management appear co-extensive. They 
manifestly share the same salient features and they grapple with the same 
universal problems of human action, decision and behaviour in a 
socio-economic context. So, strategy and rationality are extensionally 
equivalent: in that sense at least strategy is rationality. What else could 
it be? The onus now seems to lie with detractors to identify where the two 
concepts really differ, if at all. 
(ii) Prescription. There is a deep, strong undercurrent favouring 
prescriptive approaches in strategic management research (e.g., Camerer, 
1985; Freeman, 1984). Moreover, in practice, strategic level managers often 
seek advice about what they should do ... mostly, if not entirely, on behalf of 
the whole organization (e.g., Ansoff, 1987). This search for prescription 
in strategic management does not sit at all comfortably with rejections of 
corporate rational-agency, since all prescriptions for action on behalf of 
the firm as a whole (i.e. strategic management) are necessarily grounded in 
some form of rationality. The present concept of the firm or organization 
as a plurally-rational-agent effectively solves this conundrum. 
(iii) Empirical Programs Rationalistic enquiry, previously rather neglected, 
is now placed directly alongside empirical investigation in 
strategic-management research. . This echoes some current trends in related 
disciplines (e.g., Hargreaves-Heap, 1989) and simply re-affirms the historic 
partnership between rationalism and empiricism in the creation of knowledge. 
Findings from empirical strategy research could now take on additional 
significance, as they could be used to elaborate on concepts of rational 
decision and action. For example, studies of (corporate) competitive and 
co-operative behaviour (e.g., Neilsen, 1989) might yield anchoring points for 
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quite general theories of gaming between boundedly-rational agents. 
Similarly, .empirical interface programs (e. g., Schwenk 1988; Hi tt et al, 
1991) that investigate relationships between strategy paradigms, potentially 
inform (and could be informed by) their corresponding meta-rational arguments 
(cf. Singer 1991). Previously, empirical evidence of individual behavior has 
been used to shape new concepts of rationality (e.g. quasi-rationality); now 
organisational evidence might perform a similar function. This idea is 
explored further in section 4. 
(iv) Conflicting analyses. Paradoxes and conflicting prescriptions for 
strategic management decisions may now be recast as meta-rational enquiries 
(cf. Singer, 1991). Under the isomorphism, the problems in S are represented 
in ~ as meta-rational arguments. In some cases this yields new insights and 
partial solutions. Meta-rational arguments can contribute to understanding 
strategy; but contributions in the reverse direction may also be identified, 
where knowledge about strategy seems to inform theories of rationality. 
These are also discussed more fully in section 4. 
Techniques of strategy analysis 
A synthesis of rationalistic and empirical approaches can serve the 
practical knowledge requirements of strategic-level managers. These 
knowledge requirements extend beyond empirical findings and statistical 
relationships (e.g., PIMS studies, etc). to include the reasoning processes, 
motivations and complex rationales that are theselves the very substance of 
the general theory of rationality. Accordingly, plural-rationality could be 
used to underpin strategic-decision-aids. 
The idea of shaping decision techniques around particular conceptions of 
rationality is certainly not new. Most management decision techniques rest 
on latent assumptions about the nature of rational choice. Capital budgeting 
techniques (e. g. , present-value) implicitly assume known goals and 
near-omniscience; whilst strategy heuristics or marketing "boxes" (e. g. , 
Wensley, 1981) implicitly assume imperfect forms. The hypergaming technique 
of Bennett & Huxham (1982) is also distinctive, in this respect, combining 
elements of cognitive and strategic-belief rationalities in a novel way. 
Plural-rationality can also be invoked as the underpinning of simple 
strategic analysis techniques. First, the SCIO method may be used to 
structure the decision making process around normative considerations flowing 
from the plural rationalities. Next, a variant ·of SCIO enriches the 
strategic intelligence process by viewing competitor organizations as 
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plurally-rational agents. Finally a set of simple diagnostics may be derived 
from meta-rational arguments, that can be used to resolve conflicting 
model-based prescriptions or to routinely qualify model-based analysis. 
(i) The "SCIO" method 
The scro method (described in Singer et ai, 1987 and Singer 1992) .. expands 
the traditional scope of strategic-option evaluation. "scro" stands for 
Specifying Canonical Issues and Options. The central idea is that these 
issues and options may be identified and then classified with deliberate 
reference to each form of rationality, in turn. That is, the plural 
rationalities may themselves be used like a checklist, or mnemonic. 
To illustrate, in the context of poli ticised corporate divestments by 
MNC's, issues in the policy debate were classified: as "corporate-egoist" 
(i. e. direct commercial) "corporate-sympathy" (i. e. stakeholder) and "purely 
ethical". The latter category facilitated identification of specific ethical 
issues such as relativism and clean-hands, placing them alongside more 
familiar commercial arguments like "appeasing consumer groups" (sympathy) or 
"avoiding management hassle" (egoist). 
Similarly, in the acquisitions decision context, scro systematically 
draws attention to hidden normative issues like the traditions and sense of 
identity of the target firm (systemic, expressive forms), the role of 
bluffing, model-use (strategic, intensive forms, etc.). These are placed 
alongside more conventional planning considerations, such as forecasts of 
combined market-power and E.P.S. 
The resulting decision process is more inclusive or continent (cf. 
Davidson, 1980) with respect to the fullest possible range of normatively 
relevant issues. Conventional approaches to strategic option-evaluation are 
quite myopic by comparison with scro. Planners using conventional strategic 
and financial techniques are in effect "choosing their own rationality". Put 
differently, they are selectively attending only to a subset of the issues 
that have normative relevance, according to contemporary theories of 
rationali ty. 
(ii) SCIO- 2, Competitor Analysis 
An adaptation of scro yields a new qualitative methodology for 
com~etitive analysis (Singer, 1992). Put simply, a view of other 
organizations as plurally-rational-agents can enrich interpretations of the 
observable historical facts. A competitor's position, cost-structures, power 
relationships, management profiles, may be coupled to other considerations 
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flowing from the plural rationalities: identity preservation, communicative 
actions, precommitments, cognitive resources, core-belief-structures and 
myopic "blind spots". It is quite simple to compile a list of diagnostic 
questions for competitor-analysis, by referring systematically to the plural 
rationali ties. 
(iii) Diagnostics and meta-rational arguments 
Diagnostics derived from meta-rational arguments can be used to resolve 
conflicting model-based strategy prescriptions (Singer, 1991). These 
diagnostics can also be used for routinely qualifying model-based strategy 
evaluations (e. g. , ex-ante financial appraisals). Examples are: "which 
causal or statistical relationships have been employed?", "Have multilateral 
(game theoretic) situations been identified?", "Is corporate tradition or 
cuI ture a factor?", "Do subjective probabili tes reflect sufficient 
knowledge?" . 
4. META-RATIONALITY AND STRATEGIC MYSTERIES 
The latter diagnostic technique is based upon the idea that conflicting 
model-based strategy prescriptions can be partially resolved with reference 
to corresponding meta-rational arguments. A modest expansion of this idea 
sheds light on mysteries of strategic management, by recasting them as 
equivalent problems of rationality. Thus, strategy is potentially informed 
by meta-rational insights. And vice-versa: strategy research can contribute 
to theories of rationality, as follows. 
Meta-rationality 9 strategic mysteries 
Some examples of meta-rationality informing strategy are briefly outlined 
in this section. These include the optimal strategy problem, expressive 
strategies, strategic timing, adaptive search strategy and not-for-profi t 
commi tments. 
(U. Optimal-strategy. The "optimal rationality problem" (Marsh, 1978) 
concerns balancing calculated forms against rule-based forms (selective, 
procedural). The Achilles-heel of the former is the non-forecastability of 
complex social systems (e.g, MacIntyre, 1984; Makridakis, 1988), whilst that 
of rule-based forms is found both in the limited amount of experience 
summarised and in the degree of similarity between past and current contexts. 
Given current understanding of rationality, this balancing problem demands a 
judgemental resolution. 
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Strategic~level managers can sometimes confront a corresponding 
"optimal-strategy problem" of balancing organizational traditions and policy 
principles against ex ante financial calculation. For example, In the 
evaluation of strategic acquisition proposals, traditions of internal 
development (quite common in Japanese corporations) frequently confront 
posi tive-NPV or favourable EPS-growth projections. The tension or conflict 
between the associated prescriptions is no more than a surface manifestation 
of the corresponding meta-rational argument. 
A variant of this optimal-strategy problem is found in the rather 
mysterious "foward-in-reverse planning logic" prescribed by Hayes (1985) in 
a seminal article on corporate strategy. In that article, Hayes instructed 
management to delay goal-setting until organizational capabilities have 
developed and strategy has emerged. This directly violates conventional 
goal-setting philosphies (i.e. 'if you don't know where your going ... '). The 
relationship (in S) between these opposite "planning logics" may now be 
understood as the calculated-versus-systemic meta-rational argument (in R). 
(ii). Non-instrumental. expressive strategies. Considerations of corporate 
autonomy and identity can sometimes drive corporate investment. For example, 
case studies strongly suggest that such entrepreneurial projects as the 
Federal Express "2apmail" project, the Hughes Aircraft Corp. "Spruce Goose" 
and the Anglo-French Concorde SST, were not driven by calculations of 
anticipated profits. In any case, such calculations would have been highly 
unreliable, since they were exploring the unknown. The strategic investments 
are, however, quite readily understood in terms of expressive rationality 
(e.g., Hargreaves-Heap, 1989) as symbols of corporate capability, or as steps 
in a (rational) search for positive-freedom or self-realisation (of the 
organization) . 
A meta-rational argument now tells us that such strategies absolutely 
defy attempts at conventional risk-return analysis: expressively-rational 
actions cannot be reduced to calculated forms of rationality, since the 
former places intrinsic value on experimentation with preferences or goals, 
rather than taking goals as given. That is, expressive considerations resist 
utility-theoretic formulation (Hargreaves-Heap, 1989). 
(iii). Strategic Timing. Postponement (i. e. do nothing, stay quiet, keep 
options open, maintain flexibility) is one possible rational response to 
environmental-uncertainty, since it allows unforecastable events to unfold 
until the situation is clearer (e.g. Rawls, 1984). Equally, pre-commitment 
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(immediate self-binding action) is another rational response to 
value-uncertainty. Therefore, where both types of uncertainty co-exist, as is 
often the case in strategic planning (e. g., Friend and Hickling, 1987), 
conflicting prescriptions flow directly from alternative forms of 
rationality. Since pre-emption cannot be reduced to a form of postponement (a 
meta-rational argument) the timing of strategic moves remains a conundrum, 
or mystery of strategy. 
(iv) strategic sympathy and commitment. Rational-commitments are not 
reducable to sympathy (Sen, 1977). The former involves counter-preferential 
choice or utility loss, the latter is enlightened self interest that includes 
psychological feelings of empathy. Under the isomorphism, 
rational-commitments correspond to not-for-profit corporate missions, whilst 
rational-sympathy corresponds to a stakeholders-as-constraints strategy. 
The meta-rational argument implies that these strategies are both 
rational yet fundamentally different. Strategic commitments permit loss of 
managerial utility, in service to a stakeholder cause (be it community 
welfare or shareholder wealth). More generally, the rationality-set (lR) 
includes many, but perhaps not all principles of normative ethics. 
l1eta-ethical arguments imply that moral intuitions could comprise a distinct 
and seperate dimension of strategy, not entirely reducible to plurally 
rational analysis. 
Strategy ~ rationalities 
Strategy research could also contribute to an understanding of 
philosophical problems of rationality. Decision-contexts that arise in the 
strategic management of organizations offer a rich, but so far under-utilised 
source of empirical anchoring points. These include aspects of competition, 
identity-preservation and incrementalism 
( i) Compe tit ion. Tradi tional game theory implicitly assumes neo-classical 
rationality of the players, with consistent preferences for the formal game 
outcomes. On the other hand, experimental gaming, in economics (e.g., Plott, 
1982) and psychology (e.g., Colman, 1982), involves individuals as players. 
However, evidence of competitive interactions between firms or organizations 
could also provide empirical anchoring points for game-related theories of 
competi tion. Thus, for example, empirical studies of competitive 
organizational behaviour could test hypotheses about gaming between 
imperfectly-rational agents. 
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(ii) Identities. In the strategic acquisitions context, preservation of 
identity and autonomy often assumes. an over-riding importance for the 
organization. Yet dynamic game simulations (Axelrod, 1984) also indicate that 
a failure to preserve identities could be irrational. It damages the overall 
market ethos, with negative overall consequences. Thus, the role of identity 
in the strategic acquisition context could be used to illuminate a hitherto 
concealed linkage between strategic-beliefs (gaming) and expressive 
rationality (cf. Singer 1988). 
(iii). Imperfect action strategies. There is a large literature on the 
meta-rational problem of decision versus action rationalities. Instumental 
rationalities involving formal model-use and hypothetico-deductive reasoning. 
are contrasted with the cognitive processes that mediate effective social 
action (e.g .• Garfinkel. 1967; Cohen. 1981). Yet the corresponding strategy 
conundrum is equally well-documented. It places logical incrementalism 
(Quinn, 1982) or action-rationality (Gladstein and Quinn, 1985) relative to 
traditional, formalised corporate planning. Logical incrementalism directly 
conflicts with formal logic in the strategic management process. For example, 
the latter mandates the search for information to dis-confirm hypotheses, 
whilst incrementalism prescribes a search for biased anecdotes (e~g .• 
Schwenk. 1984). One supports techniques like devils-advocacy. whilst the 
other recommends suboptimal alternatives, for the sake of organizational 
poli tics. etc. 
The strategy context suggests one possible resolution of the 
meta-rational problem, based upon selective attention and multiple game 
playing. The strategic manager attends. selectively. to a wide range of 
substantive issues whilst. at the same time, playing multiple simultaneous 
games. These games, each with multiple solutions and paradoxes. include (a) 
Jostling for personal position within the dominant coalition, (b) the 
strategic-level versus subordinates (a prisoner's dilemma). (c) the strategic 
entity now versus itself in the future, (d) the dynamic game with external 
stakeholders and competitor firms. Strategy research in general confirms the 
obvious: that strategic managerial behaviors such as signalling, consensus 
building and suboptimisation are well suited to this type of socio-economic 
env i ronmen t . 
5. CONCLUSION 
The mapping set out in Figures 1 & 2 and Tables 1 - 7 depicts an 
isomorphism between the plural rationalities and core concepts of strategic 
management. The firm, organization or strategic-entity (i.e. the subject of 
strategic management theories) is identified as a plurally rational agent 
(i. e. the subject of theories of rationality). This perspective is quite 
radical but it has several advantages. It explains and justifies the 
prescriptive dimension of strategic management theory, whilst it places 
rationalistic enquiry directly alongside empirical approaches in strategy 
research. It also enables some of the mysteries of strategic management to be 
re-examined with reference to their equivalent problems of rationality, and 
vice-versa. As a bonus, it provides a foundation for some new techniques of 
strategic analysis. 
It is historically apparent that management theories and techniques have 
trodden the paths laid down in economic theory and the other social sciences. 
Therefore a renewed attention to rationality is a now a rather natural and 
timely development for management research. The multiple-headed Hydra of 
corporate-rational-agency could return, as of old, to replace the absent 
centre of the strategic management discipline. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRA TEGY AS MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Currently at the revision stage with the Strategic Management Journal 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Looking back over the last couple of decades of management theory and 
the related social science disciplines, perhaps three macro trends stand 
out above all others. First, the subject of Business Ethics has emerged as 
an almost equal partner with the traditional, functionally-oriented 
management subjects; second, the subject of Strategic Management has 
consolidated its status as an integrative but distinctive contribution, 
concerned with management of the enterprise as a whole. Finally, in the 
source social sciences themselves, there has been a powerful resurgence of 
interest in the once-shunned subject of Rationality. Articles and books on 
that subject have proliferated rapidly, both in Economics (e. g. Sugden, 
1991, Hargreaves-Heap, 1991) and in Psychology (e.g. Kahneman, 1991) as 
well as in the disciplines of Political Science, Sociology and Philosophy 
(e.g. Hamlin, 1988; White, 1988; Elster, 1986). 
How are these three macro trends related? First, consider strategy and 
ethics: at one level, links between strategic management and business 
ethics are perfectly obvious, as the two subjects share many specific 
topics in common. For example, mergers & acquisitions, competitive 
intelligence gathering, developing organizational culture, environmental 
policy, etc. all have a place in Strategy courses as well as in Business 
Ethics courses. At another level, the strategy-ethics relationship is 
rather more theoretical, focussing on a concept of the corporation as a 
"moral person", analagous to the legal-person concept. Philosphers have 
often asked whether or not it makes sense to apply ethical theories to 
corporations or other collectives (e.g. Goodpaster et al, 1982; Werhane, 
1983; French, 1984; Rankin, 1987). The level of academic interest in this 
question has risen broadly in tandem with the emergence of Business Ethics 
as a distinctive discipline. Whilst some have seen corporate moral agency 
as the sine qua non of business ethics; the bottom line, as it were, of all 
the other philosophical arguments about morality in business contexts, 
others have taken the opposing position that only individual managers can 
be the locus of morality. 
The second leg of the triad, the strategy-rationality relationship, has 
also been a subject of much controversy, with strong differences of opinion 
about the relevance of rationality, in its various forms, to general 
management theory and practice (e.g. Brunsson, 1982; Mintzberg, 1990; 
Ansoff, 1991). This has also been framed as a dispute about whether or not 
it makes sense to view a firm or organization as a unified rational-agent, 
similar in at least some senses to an individual rational person (e. g. 
43 
Arrow, 1963, Levi, 1986). "Rational agent", in this context simply means 
any entity to which the general theory of rationality applies. As discussed 
subsequently in this article, some broad pathways to resolving the 
controversy about corporate rational agency have already been laid down. 
Finally, what of the third leg, that is, rationali ty in relation to 
ethics? This philosophical problem certainly pre-dates the other two; it 
is now the subject of numerous meta-rational and meta-ethical arguments, 
searching for the foundations of ethics and morality in formal reason and 
logic. Recently, there has been much progress on this issue, associated 
with developments in game theory and decision theory (Mackie, 1978; 
Axelrod, 1984; McClennan, 1990). Noting the underlying direction of these 
developments, the philosopher Williams (1985) has commented that, "It 
might turn out (that) we are committed to an ethical life ... because we are 
rational agents". Taken together, the three macro trends are now pointing 
the way towards a new theoretical perspective; one that is quite radical, 
but is nonetheless capable of being operationalized for practical 
managerial purposes. The new perspective sees that the latent, general 
prescriptive theory of strategic management is nothing other than 
contemporary Moral Philosophy, with the corporation cast as a moral agent. 
In this way, the subjects of Strategic Management and Business Ethics can 
now be brought much closer together. 
Structure of this chapter 
First, the conceptual framework of "Strategy as Rationality" set out in 
the preceding chapter is briefly revisited and presented in a more formal 
manner, together with a rather more detailed discussion of the various ~ # S 
correspondences that involve goals and ends-rationalities. The latter are 
especially pertinent to ethics and moral-agency. Next, the 
strategy-as-rationality framework is then extended to a new viewpoint that 
sees "Strategy as Moral Philosphy", with an accompanying defence of the 
implied concept of corporate moral agency (CMA). With the extended framework 
of moral-agency in place, it then becomes possible On section· 4 of the 
paper) to deve lop a broader concept ion of what corporations should do, or 
what strategy should be. Put differently, prescription in strategic 
management may now be extended far beyond its traditional Economic 
orientation. 
This structure may be summarised quite succinctly, as follows: 
0) "Strategy as Rationality": In the preceding chapter, an isomorphism 
between a. set of strategy-concepts, S, and a set of rationality-concepts, 
R, was set out and is now elaborated and formalised. 
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(ii) "Rationality as Ethics": Some of the many pathways from a plural 
conception rationality to principles of ethics or Moral Philosphy are 
briefly traced out. 
Then, taking (i) and (ii) together, leads directly to "Strategy as Horal 
Phi losphy". This position, in turn, requires a defence of corporate moral 
agency (CMA) and this is duly offered in section 3 of the chapter. 
In section 4 of the paper, prescription in strategic management is 
re-interpreted, in a way that explicitly integrates Ethics with Strategy. 
Three applications of the new framework are outlined in section 4. First, 
meta-rational and meta-ethical criteria are used to and classify and evaluate 
strategy concepts, such as: stakeholders-as-constraints, competitive 
analysis, etc. A similar approach is then applied to formal strategy models 
such as BCG (Day, 1986) and CAPM (Naylor et al, 1982), etc. Finally, some of 
the enduring mysteries of strategy, such as timing, identities and sunk costs 
are recast as rational-moral dilemmas to which Moral Philosophy now 
potentially offers some solutions. 
2. STRATEGY AS RATIONALITY 
The main elements of the conceptual framework that sees "Strategy as 
Rationality", were set out in the preceding chapter (Singer 1992a). In 
short, each distinctive form of rationality, in R, corresponds with a 
strategy concept, in $, whose meaning is either the same, or very, very 
similar. In extending this framework towards one that sees strategy as moral 
philosphy, the particular R ~ $ correspondences involving ends or goals, 
are especially pertinent. As compared to theories of rationality, ethics 
pays even closer attention to questions about goals. The (Weberian and 
Rawlsian) notion that rationality has something to do with the choice of 
goals, as well as means to. achieve them, are now quite clearly echoed in 
modern strategic management theories, as follows: 
1. RATIONAL-EGOISM ~ SHAREHOLDER-VALUE-CREATION. Egoism involves 
satisfying one's own preferences (i.e. utility maximisation). If this 
is set in carefully specified market contexts, it formally yields 
Pareto-optimal outcomes. This result is at the heart of the normative 
theory of shareholder value-creation. Assuming appropriate managerial 
reward and incentive structures are in place, the two concepts, egoism 
for individuals and value-creation for firms, are very similar; in 
terms of their origin and their ethical justification. 
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2. RATIONAL-SYMPATHY ~ STAKEHOLDERS-AS-CONSTRAINTS. Extended forms of 
ends-rationalities correspond with the general stakeholder approach in 
strategic management. Both flow from the idea that it is rational 
(right, good) to have other goals in addition to self-interest, or 
shareholder value-creation, respectively. The "sympathy" form of 
extended individual rationality (Sen, 1977) correponds precisely to 
Ansoff's (1965) stakeholders-as-constraints position. Both see that 
serving others interests is prudential and pragmatically necessary, en 
route to achieving egoist goals in the longer term. 
3. RATIONAL COMMITMENT ~ NOT-FOR-PROFIT. In contrast, Sen's rational 
commitments by the individual involve counter-preferential choice, 
genuine utility loss, or altruism. This corresponds to the special 
ethos of a not-for-profi t organization. In these cases, there is an 
over-riding (but rational) commitment to a non-financial cause (e.g., 
health provision, providing employment, aesthetics, etc). 
These forms of ends-rationality progressively increase in sophistication. 
The next level of complexity moves beyond attempts to specify rational goals, 
towards an emphasis on the processes of goal formulation. These more complex 
notions of ends-rationality recognise ambiguity (e.g., Marsh, 1978) and the 
absence of universal ideals for rational choice. Doubt or ambiguity about 
goals is a central problem for individual rationality (e.g. Marsh, 1978), as 
it is for organizational strategy and planning (e. g. Friend et al 1978), 
accordingly we have: 
4. DELIBERATIVE RATIONALITY ~ FORMULATING GOALS. The Rawlsian notion of 
a rational individual deliberating on goals corresponds to the concept 
of a policy dialogue, or the political and organizational process of 
goal formulation under ambiguity (e.g. Quinn, 1977). 
5. EXPRESSIVE RATIONALITY ~ CONTINUOUS GOAL PROCESSES. In the absence 
of a definitive goal, the search for individuals' goals is continuous 
and important, or rational, in its own right. It underpins a person's 
sense of autonomy (self management) which is of ultimate value, beyond 
what is normally considered as "wealth". This applies to the 
expressively rational individual (Hargreaves-Heap, 1989) as it does to 
"rational" organizations (e. g. the Ringi process, that symbolises 
organizational autonomy and identity). 
6. SYSTEMIC (POSTERIOR) RATIONALITY ~ EMERGENT STRATEGIC VISION In 
contrast with calculated means-ends logic, systemic forms of individual 
rationality explicitly involve history. In particular, posterior 
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rationality (e. g., Marsh, 1978) refers to the emergence of individual 
goals, over time, as a historical process. This form or rationality 
corresponds to the "ways-means-ends" recipe (or "logic" ) for 
competitive organizational strategy, set out in a seminal article by 
Hayes (1985). Just as a rational person's goals emerge over time, as a 
function of historical experience and capabilities, so does the 
strategic vision of the firm. 
7. ETHICAL REASONING CATEGORIES ~ STRATEGIC TYPOLOGY. Finally, each of 
the major approaches to ethical reasoning lends itself directly to a 
distinctive corporate policy (Freeman, 1984). Utilitarianism in ethics 
corresponds to the use of social cost-benefit analysis in strategic 
choice; Contractarian or Rawlsian "strategies" (Freeman, 1984) are 
ultimately driven by concerns of fairness and justice. Some 
organizations exist specifically to promote these ideals. Deontological 
or Kantian strategies recognise corporate duties, or simply "doing 
what is right", even in situations where this runs counter to 
mainstream commercial considerations (Goodpaster, 1988; Singer et ai, 
1987). The issue of politicised divestments by MNC's exemplifies this 
si tuation. 
In sum, the language and conceptual foundations of strategic management 
theory very closely parallel those of the plural rationalities. This is 
surely no coincidence. It may explained by the simple observation that 
both sets of concepts (IR and 51) are grappl ing wi th qui te universal 
problems of action, decision and behavior, set in socio-economic contexts. 
Isomorphism 
A more complete synthesis of strategy and rationality may be achieved by 
considering the implied 1 1 correspondence beteen IR and 51 as an 
isomorphism, a structure-preserving map, as first dscribed in the preceding 
chapter.. More formally, a structure of isomorphism may be implanted in IR 
(and hence in 51) using two types of meta-rational relationship: 
0) "r is a form of r 
1 j " For example, sympathy .. . is a form of ... 
extended-ends-rationality. 
Oi) " r has significant common properties with r". for example, 
k 1 
expressive rationality (which concerns communicative action like 
signalling) .. . has significant common properties with .. . Elster's (1986) 
strategic-belief rationality (which is concerned with game-theoretic 
interdependencies). 
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The relational structure in S is similar, and is preserved (or, in some 
cases implanted) using the structure-preserving R ~ S isomorphism. 
(Figure 1.) 
FIGURE 1. THE CONCEPT OF ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN RAND S. 
IR 
S 
& & I I \ 
0' I C3 ~ 
3 x 3 (r . r) 
1 J 
for some k, 1. 
'I •.. is a form of ... , 
J 
Sk •• • is a form of '" sl' in a similar sense. 
* Corresponding to (i) & (ii) in R, we have (i) and 
relationships between their respective images, as follows: 
* 
* (ii) , in S, as 
(i) Stakeholders-as-constraints (Ansoff, 1965). .. is a form of 
... organizational goal system. 
* (ii ) Positioning is an ingredient of organizational strategy (e. g. 
Mintzberg 1987). This strategy-concept .. has significant common 
properties with ... signalling behaviour. 
In these examples the relational structures in Rand S are preserved. 
In other cases the mapping, considered as an ismorphism, uncovers or hints 
at relationships within Rand S that have not yet received much attention 
in the respective literatures (Singer, 1991 and 1992a). The pat tern of 
reasoning illustrated by these two examples may be made quasi-formal, as 
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follows: 
Let (r, r) be any pairwise relationship in R that is a 
1 J 
meta-rational relationship like those described above. The mapping: 
::>: R => S; gives: 
::> (r) = s 
1 k 
and ::> (r) = s 
J 1 
for some k, 1. 
Then for alII, J, we have 
::> x::> (r , r) 
1 j 
= (s • s), for some k, 1. 
k 1 
The latter pairwise relationship in S; is an interface relationship 
between a pair of strategy concepts. Expressed in words, "all forms of 
rationality have their counterpart strategy concepts, whilst the strategy 
interface concepts reflect the meta-rational relationships". That is, ::> is 
an isomorphism, or structure preserving map that identified Rand S; as 
essentially the same thing. 
An R # S; isomorphism specified in this way effectively demonstrates 
that the concepts of strategic management and plural rationality are 
co-extensive, with similar meaning and scope. "strategy" and "Rationali ty" 
are extensionally equivalent, as concepts, because they share the same 
salient features. Put differently, strategy IS rationality. What else 
could it be? Only the identity of the agent, or actor, differentiates 
between the two concepts (Figure 2.). 
FIGURE 2. ISOMORPHISM AND CORPORATE-RATIONAL-AGENCY 
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For concepts in IR, the agent is normally the individual person, or a 
particular cognitive system. For concepts in S, the firm or organization as a 
whole is the primary candidate for the agent (Ansoff, 1987). Moreover, as 
explained in section 2 of the preceding chapter, the various arguments 
opposing the concept of the corporation as a rational agent (i.e. cognitive-
limits, social-choice, systems-theory, political-perspective) are now quite 
vunerable to the new interpretation involving the plural rationality of the 
strategic entity. 
3. STRATEGY AS MORAL-PHILOSOPHY 
If Strategy and Rationality are both broadly concerned with problems of 
action, decision and behavior set in socio-economic contexts, then so too is 
ethics and the broad 
rationali ties r e IR 
discipline of Moral-Philosophy. 
are intertwined wi th almost 
approaches to ethical reasoning, such as Teleology, 
Accordingly, the 
all of the major 
Deontology and 
Contractarianism. In addition, recent developments in game-theory map out 
quite new pathways from the assumed rationality of players to their de facto 
morality. 
Teleological, or consequentialist ethics (utilitarianism, egoism) are 
associated with instrumental rationality, or choosing means to achieve known 
goals. These include "pursuit of self-interest" (egoism) and "the greatest 
good for the greatest number" (utilitarianism). The rationality-ethics 
linkages here are quite transparent. According to De George (1990, p 44) "A 
rationally operated company tries to maximise its good and minimise its bad." 
(i. e. corporate-egoism) whilst utilitarianism "describes what rational people 
do in making moral decisions". It is also a description of what rational 
organizations do when they conduct a full socio-economiccost-benefit 
analysis. Perhaps, then, the only distinction between rationality and ethics 
in these senses is that the former emphasises means, whilst the latter 
emphasises ends. Yet, in theory as in practice, means and ends are 
inextricably intertwined. 
The role of rationality in the alternative, deontological ethics, is even 
more crucial. According to De George (1990, p66), the deontological tradition 
considers that "being moral is the same as being rational". Also, "by 
analysing reason ... we find the key to morality". In this context "reason" 
and "rationality" incorporate conscious reflection and analysis, leading us 
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to the categorical imperatives of the Kantian ethical tradition. (e. g. A 
moral agent should act according to universalizable principles. ) 
More recently, developments in Game Theory (Elster's "strategic 
rationali ty") have explained many aspects of moral behavior in terms of the 
special rationality. Mackie (1980) has shown how game theory explains many 
principles of everday morality, such as returning favours. In a similar 
spirit, Axelrod (1984) has used computers to explore the vast complexities of 
dynamic gaming, uncovering economically rational foundations for being "nice, 
forgiving, provocable and clear". In Axelrod's analysis the players are 
disembodied, yet once again they have been honoured elsewhere with a dual 
interpretion: as individuals (in Axelrod's own commentry) and as firms, in 
the strategy literature (e.g. Neilsen, 1989; Singer, 1988). 
Psychological games forge yet another pathway between rationality and 
ethics. In these games, players' payoffs depend on the beliefs of the other 
players (as distinct from their strategy). This device opens the way for 
incorporating the effects of guilt and gratitude into the calculus of 
game-playing (e.g. Geanakoplos et ai, 1989). In sum, as Williams (1985) has 
noted: "It might turn out (that) we are committed to an ethical 
life ... because we are rational agents." As new theoretical developments 
steadily unfold (e.g. McLennan, 1990) this remark becomes ever more salient. 
Moreover, it quite plainly applies with equal force to the "ethical life" of 
the rational corporation. It is prompted, not by the definition of the 
agent, but by the many shared characteristics of rationality and morality. 
The complete framework may now be set out (Figure 3). First, as 
outlined earlier, the structure set S of core Strategic Management concepts 
is demonstrably isomorphic to the structured set ~ of plural rationalities. 
The implied concetp of CRA may then be defended against the major anti-CRA 
arguments, by appealing to the broader concept of plural rationality. Second, 
as indicated above, the overall fabric of the plural rationalities is quite 
sufficient to wrap up much of ethical theory and practical morality, leading 
to a new viewpoint that sees "Strategy as Moral Philosophy", with the 
corporation now cast as a moral agent. 
Like CRA in organization theory, CMA has also been repeatedly challenged 
in the Business Ethics literature. The tension between pro and anti CMA 
camps has at least equalled that between opposing camps on rational-agency, 
with the major anti-CMA arguments including: (i) the machine metaphor, (ii) 
the anti-ethics position, (iii) CMA as a diversion, and (iv) descriptive 
ethics. These independent challenges to CMA must also now be confronted. 
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The various challenges to CMA are now all quite vulnerable to the 
arguments from rationality to ethics, as follows: 
(i) MACHINE METAPHOR: The organization may be likened to a machine, 
controlled by individuals who must themselves accept moral 
responsibility (e.g., Danley, 1984). 
This metaphor opposes CMA because it suggests that the individual 
managers are the only moral agents (drivers, not cars). However, the 
identification of organizations as plurally rational agents, more akin to 
living systems than machines (in the Danley sense), completely undermines 
the metaphor, because such "machines" are not rational agents. 
(ii) ANTI -ETHICS: Knowledge is subordinated to power relationships, 
whilst ethics is seen as "an affliction of the weak" (Neitche, 1886). Put 
differently: "Conscience doth make cowards ... " [Hamlet], or, "If we talk 
of reason let us shut our gates and sleep ... " [Troilus & Cressida]. 
52 
The explicit identification of rational-ethics with strategy now presents 
a major difficulty for this anti-CMA position, simply because rejecting all 
of ethics now also entails rejecting very large tracts of prescriptive 
management theory (e.g. Stakeholder management). 
(iii) DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS: Empirical Social Psychology and descriptive 
ethics sees groups and organizations as belonging to a different moral 
category from individuals. Group moral judgements are in fact distorted 
relative to the individual's conscience (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977). 
This argues from "is to ought". Moreover, to the extent that group 
decisions empirically fail to match individual's ethical standards, the need 
for linking strategy to ethics, with an implied concept of CHA, becomes that 
much greater. 
(iv) CMA AS DIVERSION: Arguments for CMA are harmful "diversions" from 
the "moral crusade" to the soul of individual managers (e. g., Rankin, 
1987) . 
This anti-CMA argument does not make it clear whose attention is being 
diverted. In contrast "Strategy as Moral Philosophy" can now be 
operationalized as a technique for strategic analysis, that directs 
managerial attention to ethical concerns, alongside mainstream commercial 
issues (i.e. the SCIO technique, chapters 2, 4, 5) Finally, the case for 
CMA may be further reinforced by an appeal to other, independent, pro-CMA 
arguments in the Business Ethics literature, as follows: 
(i) EMERGENCE: This sees corporate conscience as an emergent property 
of complex, evolving, cognitive systems (e.g., Singer, 1984). Arguably, 
modern corporations are now at the critical stage of evolution where 
their collective conscience is starting to emerge as a necessity of 
survival. 
(ii) INTENTIONALITY: This analytic. argument (French, 1984) sees the 
internal decision structure of the corporation as the key to a meaningful 
description of corporate acts as "intentional" and hence as carrying 
moral responsibility. 
(iii) SECONDARY AGENCY: This argument (e.g., Werhane, 1983) equates the 
corporation to a "hired gun", with the corporation having the same moral 
standing as a person who actually pulls the trigger. 
(iv) SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: This is a plea for moral responsibility by 
business leaders and corporations as a whole. It it is widely associated 
with the stakeholder approach in strategic management and a form of moral 
agency (e.g. Goodpaster et ai, 1982). 
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In sum, denial of CMA has now become an extreme, barely tenable position. 
It could perhaps be sustained by insisting upon strictly a-rational 
foundations for ethics, like intuitionism or divine command theory. The only 
remaining tactic for denying CMA is radical indeed: a rejection of large 
tracts of prescriptive strategic management theory! 
4. PRESCRIPTION IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
"strategy as Moral Philosophy" links the plural rationalities and ethics 
directly to prescription in Strategic Management. First, in this section of 
the paper, it is shown how strategy concepts and models may now be evaluated 
with reference to normatively appealng meta-rational and meta-ethical 
criteria, 1. e. criteria for "choosing rationalities". Next, the framework is 
made operational as a decision aid that effectively integrates ethical with 
commercial considerations. Finally, it is suggested how Moral Philosophy 
could now offer new perspectives on such mysteries of strategy as timing, 
identity, and sunk costs. 
(i) Choosing rationalities. 
A focus on such strategy concepts as competitive analysis, 
stakeholders-as-constraints, etc., also corresponds, wi thin the framework, 
to a choice of rationalities, in R. This immediately invites the question: 
"Which rationalities & ethics should be used to prescribe strategy?" 
Moral Philosophy has identified several meta-rational and meta-ethical 
criteria, for classifying and evaluating the 
follows: 
r e R (hence s e S) as 
(a). AGGREGATEvs AGENT ORIENTATION: Some rationalities, e.g. utility 
maximisation (RUM), act as foundations of· aggregate-level Economic theories, 
associated with public-policy prescriptions. These are the Economic 
rationali ties, r e REC • Other r e REC c R, e. g. expressive, 
resolute, contextual, are primarily oriented towards a localised 
decision-theory, more at the level of the individual (or corporate) agent. 
These forms emphasise some of the more subtle dimensions of rationality 
involving identity and co-ordination. These EC r e Rare, prima facie at 
least as relevant as the mainstream Economic rationalities to prescribing 
strategy at the level of the firm. 
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(b). RUM-CAPTURED vs. ELUSIVE: Some r e IRe c IR may be "captured" 
by formal meta-rational arguments, that identify then as special cases of 
RUM. For example, bounded is captured by RUM after allowing for the costs of 
information and computation. Other r e IR are more "elusive". For example, 
commitments, expressive, contextual forms all genuinely extend notions of 
rationali ty beyond the ( traditional) Economic sense. Thus, a 
plurally-rational strategy should involve occasional corporate self-
sacrifice; express fundamental corporate values; or work towards creating and 
maintaining traditions and institutions. 
(c). TEMPORAL-ORIENTATION: Foward-Looking vs. Backward-Looking: Forward 
looking rationalities, IRFOW c IR, are defined without reference to the past, 
whilst for r e IRBAK there is at least some explicit historic reference. The 
set IRBAK includes: posterior, 
contextual forms, amongst others. 
adaptive, quasi, selected, resolute, 
The partition of IR = IRBAK U IRFOW 
and 
now 
underpins the strategy prescription of adapting to the past whilst, at the 
same time integrating with possible futures (Mintzberg, 1990; Ansoff, 1991; 
Kervern, 1990). 
(d) META-ETHICAL SCOPE Several other meta ethical criteria critically 
evaluate the scope of any given form of rationality, r e IR, as follows: 
Globally vs Locally Optimal (Mclennan, 1990). A globally-optimising r e IR 
maximises total lifetime utility for the agent, after taking into account the 
impact of current decisions on the agent's future preferences, learning or 
habit-formation, and co-ordination with others (resolute is "global", RUM is 
"local" ). 
Universalizable vs Exclusive (Kant, 1956). A universalizable r e IR is one 
that the agent prefers other agents to adopt (Kant ian is universalisable, by 
definition, RUM is not, in Prisoners' Dilemma Games. 
Self-Supporting vs. Self-Defeating (Gautier, 1990). A self-supporting r e IR 
hypothetically chooses itself when used to select an r e IR, as in Figure 
4; Whilst· Kant ian and commi tment are self-supporting, in this sense, RUM is 
self -defeating in Prisoner's Dilemmas. 
Collectively, these and several other meta-criteria characterise a 
prescriptive gap that now seperates the assumptions of mainstream Economics 
from several other normative principles of rationality and ethics. Put 
differently, whilst the axioms of RUM models in Economics have a powerful 
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normative appeal, so do the various meta-criteria that RUM fails. Now, with 
"Strategy as Moral Philosophy" in place, these same meta-criteria could 
also be used to evaluate strategy concepts, S E S. 
For example, under the mapping 1, the concept of STAKEHOLDERS AS 
CONSTRAINTS, in S, corresponds to rational sympathy in IR. As a form of 
rationali ty r E IR the latter is: Agent-oriented, RUM-captured (utility 
could be maximised after allowing for the impact on others), also 
foward-looking, local, non-Universalisable, and self-defeating. 
"STAKEHOLDERS AS CONSTRAINTS", in 51, is thus characterised as a component of 
a general prescriptive theory of strategy, in exactly the same way. Put 
differently, it makes sense to say that corporate strategy should be 
predicated on a view of stakeholders-as-constraints, but this sense of 
"should" is qualified by the meta-criteria. 
A rather similar approach also applies to evaluating and choosing formal 
strategy models (Singer, 1991). The decision-function-rationality, D (M) 
of a model M E ~, the set of models, is a mapping that associates any given 
model, M with its underlying formes) of rationality, r Ii E IR. Formally, 
i 
for any given model, M E~, the model-set, we have: 
» ( M ) = { r Ii 
1 
Ii 
r 
2 
Ii 
r 
k 
} c IR 
For strategy models such as the BCG growth-share-matrix (e.g. Day, 1986), 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (e. g. Naylor, 1983), Social Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (e.g., Prest et al 1985), respectively: 
»(BCG) = {strategic-beliefs, imperfect } 
»(CAPM) = { RUM } 
» (CBA) = { Act-utilitarianism} etc. 
The prescriptive status of the models is then equated with the status of 
their decision-function-rationalities, r E IR, relative to the above 
meta-criteria (Figure 5). Thus, for example, CAPM identifies investments 
that should be made, but only within a sense of "should", qualified by the 
meta-cri teria, applied to RUM E IR. Some rather similar rationality-based 
approaches to model evaluation (meta-modelling) have been proposed before, by 
Morecroft (1983), Myers (1984), Eilon, (1985), Van Gigch (1990) and Singer 
(1991) . 
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FIGURE 4. CHOOSING RATIONALITIES, STRATEGY CONCEPTS AND MODELS. 
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The entire set R can now also be used to underpin strategy formulation. 
The SCIO technique: "Specifying Canonical Issues and Options" (or "I Know" J 
in Latin) views knowledge of the plural rationalities within an 
organizational economy-of-cognition (e.g. Bourgine, 1989). Thus, if 
managerial attention is a scarce resource, at least some attention should 
then be allocated to each r e R, when formulating or evaluating strategy. 
Thus, rationalities involving histories and traditions, co-ordination with 
others, identities, beliefs as well as ethical issues all have a place in 
strategy prescriptions, alongside conventional Economic considerations. 
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This philosphy simply represents a generalisation of the earlier trends, 
in the 1970s, away from "myopic" profit planning (parametric rationality) 
towards "competitive strategy" (strategic rationality). If according to that 
earlier doctrine, planners should "think strategically", then it may now be 
asked why they should not also think in terms of the entire set R. Certainly, 
the meta rational and ethical criteria do not rule this out. Accordingly, a 
new strategic decision model, M is now needed, for which: 
R 
D (M) = R 
R 
Finding M is quite simple: it is nothing other than Tables 1-7 set 
R 
out in chater 2. That table may itself be used to structure a 
plurally-rational, hence ethical decision process. It may be used in this way 
in a wide variety of strategy contexts, for example: 
POLITICAL DIVESTMENTS: In politicized divestments by MNCs, the checklist 
directs attention to purely ethical issues as "clean hands" (the ethics 
of participation) and "relativism" (principles for different societies) 
that might otherwise be ignored. These may then be considered relative 
to conventional commercial considerations, possibly expressed in terms of 
their impact on key performance parameters, like the effect of political 
pressure groups in the MNC home country (Singer et al 1987). 
ACQUISITIONS: In acquisitions contexts, other elements of R, e.g., 
systemic, expressive, intensive forms, focus attention on such 
plurally-rational issues as traditions, identities, and formal-model-use 
within the target corporation, respectively. 
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS: SCIO may also be adapted for use in business 
competitor analysis (Singer 1992b). In this context, a view of other 
"competi tor" organizations as plurally-rational-agents can enrich 
understanding of observed strategic behavior (see chapter 5). 
In yet other contexts, analysis of the firm's strategic position and 
prospects involves consideration of the sense of corporate autonomy, learning 
from mistakes, symbolic acts, fairness issues, etc. In sum, the scro 
technique forges quite practical linkages between Strategic and Ethical 
analysis. In contrast, managers using conventional strategic and financial 
planning concepts are, at the same time, choosing their rationalities and 
their ethics, by selectively attending to a strict subset of R. 
58 
(iii) Mysteries of Strategy 
Further applications of "Strategy as Moral Philosphy" concern some of the 
more enduring mysteries, or paradoxes of strategy. These may be recast as 
general rational-moral dilemmas. Thus, Moral Philosophy potentially informs 
the theory of strategy in such areas as : timing, identity and sunk-costs, as 
follows: . 
STRATEGIC TIMING 
strategy models, 
models with : 
Postponement has recently been the focus of several 
M E 1M [P 1 C 1M (Pindyck, 1991) . These are all Economic 
1 
» (M ) = RUM, 
1 
[P 1 for all M E 1M 
1 
However, alternative rationality assumptions, particularly precommitment 
are also quite relevant to problems of corporate strategic timing. 
Postponement vs. precommitment is a paradox of rationality, as the former 
calls for delay, to obtain further information, but the latter prescribes 
immediate action before goals change. In short, a foundation of plural 
rationality could yield richer prescriptions for corporate strategic timing 
decisions. 
STRATEGY WITH SUNK COSTS: Investment decisions with sunk costs has also been 
th f f . t t d I IM[SKl C 1M St (1980), e ocus 0 varIOUS s ra egy mo e s, , e. g. aw, 
Schwenk et al, (1989), to mention but a few. Further developments towards 
refining prescriptions could now be directly related to the entire set RBAK 
c R, of backward-looking rationalities (e.g. McLennen, 
Specifically, there is a non-empty subset, BAK* R c R, defined as: 
BAK* 
R = u { » (M) } 
M E 1M [SKl 
1990) . 
BAK* The elements of R include: contextual, resolute, selected forms of 
rationality, each of which could now inform the prescriptive theory of 
strategy, in situations involving sunk costs (see chapter 4, following). 
AUTONOMY & IDENTITY: 
economic perspectives. 
Expressive rationality combines sociological with 
It also now constitutes a distinctive theory of 
"expressive strategy", that prescribes (corporate) acts that are intentional 
expressions of (corporate) identity, or autonomous values. This particular 
r E R is not RUM-captured, because it involves experimentation with 
preferences (Hargreaves-Heap, 1989). 
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In sum, the recent developments in the general theories of rationality 
'and ethics are also, at the same time, potential developments in the 
prescriptive theory of strategic management. The present conceptual 
framework makes this linkage quite explicit. Conversely, empirical strategy 
research now becomes directly relevant to the general theories of rationality 
and ethics. Empirical programs focusing on such issues as strategic timing, 
identities, persistence, competitive and co-operative corporate strategies 
are all, at the same time, tackling some of the more enduring problems of 
Moral Philosophy (Singer 1992a). 
5. CONCLUSION 
The viewpoint that sees "Strategy as Moral Philosphy" with the 
corporation as a moral agent also reinterprets prescription in strategic 
management in terms of the plural rationalities and general principles of 
ethics. This, in turn, suggests a more holistic, mid-level approach to 
prescriptive strategic decision analysis, whilst it also points to a new 
theoretical approach to resolving some of the mysteries of strategy. 
In addition, the present conceptual framework explains several earlier 
observations about CRA and CMA, such as the "striking" congruence between 
administrative and ethical problems (Goodpaster, 1988), the "uncanny" 
parallels between planning concepts and cognitive-psychology (Hogarth et ai, 
1981), and the rather mysterious "reverse logic" of Strategic Planning 
advocated by Hayes (1985). More generally. "Strategy as Moral Philosophy" 
could complement a variety of alternative paradigms in strategic-decision 
research, such as the empirical programs of Hitt et ai, (1991), or P. Marsh 
et al (1988), the systems-theory programs of Zeleny (1980), or Van Gigch 
(1991) , the philosphical approaches of Mason et al (1981), or Van Peursen 
(1989), and the Artificial Intelligence approach of Sutherland (1989). 
Finally, it is observed that whilst the three macro trends of Strategy, 
Rationali ty and Ethics are converging, a fourth macro-trend has also made 
itself apparent. .. in the global business environment. There has been a 
qui te widespread shift towards laissez-faire public policies, in many of 
the Worlds most developed nations. As a result, the power of corporate 
,policies and strategies has correspondingly increased, suggesting that a new 
synthesis of Strategy with Ethics has now become rather more important, if 
not urgent. Such an integration of Strategy with Ethics is potentially "Une 
therapeutique - la moins violente possible - des maladies de la societe" 
(Kervern, 1990). Integration also complements the developing synthesis of 
Economics with Ethics, at the systemic level (Sen, 1977; Hamlin, 1986). In 
sum, a framework of Strategy as Moral Philosphy, with the corporation cast as 
a moral agent, is not only sustainable, it is also quite useful and timely. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is compelling evidence that living systems (e.g. individuals, 
organizations, etc.) often act, or desire to act, in ways that depend upon 
their own past actions, intentions, plans or strategies. Striking examples 
of this dependence have been identified and analysed, across the entire 
spectrum of the managerial, biological, social and cognitive sciences (e.g. 
Staw, 1976; Dawkins, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; Kavka, 1983; Thaler, 
1985). One Simple example can serve to capture the essence of the 
behavioural phenomenon at the level of the individual decision-maker: 
"You have tickets to a basketball game in a city 60 miles from your home. 
The day of the game there is a major snowstorm and the roads are very 
bad. Holding constant the value you place on going to the game, are you 
more likely to go to the game: (a) if you paid $20 each for the tickets, 
or (b) if you got the tickets for free?" (Thaler, 1985) 
When asked to respond to this question, most people choose (a) and then 
"require a lengthy explanation" to convince them that, in a sense, theirs is 
not a rational position. Many insist, for example, tha t the $20 already 
spent should not be wasted. 
There are many other examples of empirically observable choices that also 
appear to contravene the various principles of rational utility maximization 
(RUM), principles that, in turn, lie at the heart of much of mainstream 
Economic theory. These empirical findings have stimulated research in 
several inter-related disciplines, including Strategic Management. More 
specifically, psychological concepts such as cognitive-heuristics, systematic 
biases in judgement and framing effects in decision-making have all been used 
to probe mysteries of strategy, including those related to sunk costs (e.g. 
White, 1986; Bowen, 1987; Schwenk et al 1989; Bateman, 1989, to mention a 
few) . The present paper investigates further, using the new conceptual 
framework of Strategy-as-plural-Rationality (Singer 1992a,b). This framework 
now permits a quite general formulation of the sunk-cost problem for any 
plurally-rational agent or strategic entity. It also yields a prescriptive 
technique for strategic re-considerations with sunk costs, a variant of the 
SeIa inquiry-procedure. 
Two intertwined issues involving the meaning(s) and scope(s) of 
"rationality" have confronted or confounded applications of 
cognitive-psychological and social-psychological concepts to the general 
mysteries of strategic management. The first issue concerns the many 
distinctive and reasonable forms of rationality, i.e. the various· sense(s) in 
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which the empirical choices of individuals (or groups or organizations) could 
possibly be considered as "rational". The second concerns the scope(s) of 
each of these distinctive forms. That is, given any particular form of 
rationality (RUM, bounded, quasi, expressive, resolute, etc.) what is and 
is not admissable as a rational-agent or entity, for that particular form? 
For example, does the scope of quasi rationality, the form that describes 
(inter alia) the majority of responses in the basketball puzzle, extend 
beyond individuals to groups, organizations, firms, or other systems? 
The generic sunk-cost problem 
"Strategy-as-Rationality" (Singer, 1992a) provides researchers with a 
concetpual sword that can cut this Gordian Knot. It is a new framework 
(outlined in section 4 of the paper) that identifies the strategic-entity as 
a plurally-rational-agent, thereby underpinning prescriptive dimensions of 
strategic management theory. the new conceptual framework also enables a 
quite general (and rather useful) re-formulation of a generic sunk-cost 
problem. The generic sunk cost problem involves any plurally-rational agent, 
S, with a strategy or a plan, ~, as follows: 
(i) S is a plurally rational agent. That is, the behaviour of S conforms 
to all of the distinctive forms of rationality (over 38 in all) 
identified in the general theory. S's rationality varies according to 
multiple contexts, i. e. its perceived "Multiverse" (Zeleny, 1992). 
(ii) ~ is a project, plan, program, or strategy that is being re-considered 
by S, at some time, t Part of ~ (i.e. ~- ) has already been 
n 
implemented. Continuation with the next part of ~ (i. e. 1l+) is 
re-considered. Thus, S will either continue with ~ (i.e. choose ~+ ) 
or else abandon ~ thereby choosing [not ~ with ~ALT (an 
al terna ti ve) . 
Thus, in the case of S as a corporation, ~ could be, for example, the 
construction of a large plant with specified technology. In the case of S 
as an individual, ~ could be a simple plan to go to a basketball match. In 
the case of S as a digger - wasp (Dawkins, 1980) ~ could be a strategy 
of fighting challengers in the population until they surrender, in order 
to acquire a well-provisioned nest. "Strategy as Rationality" sees these as 
isomorphic problems, having essentially the same characteristics. 
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FIGURE 1. 
Theory-types 
THE GENERIC SUNK COST PROBLEM 
RE-
CONS IDERA nON 
____ of P+ by S!I 
p- at [t. ] 
n 
P + / 
[not P+l &. P --
,,-
On the face of it there are already four broad classes of theory of 
decision-making that could be applied to the generic sunk cost problem. 
These four classes are normative, descriptive, hybrid and prescriptive, as 
follows: 
IM
NORM Normative theory, a family of models is derived mathematically 
from postUlates of utility-maximising choice. Its focus is therefore on 
the logical consistency of choices and on well-defined 
structures (e.g. Bell et a1, 1983). In this sense it 
preference 
provides a 
specification of what the agent g should do. The models in this type 
of theory are mostly content-oriented, working through the "normative" 
implications of factors like reputation, competition, risk and 
reversibility. etc. Most Financial Economic models are in this class, 
along with several variants of the subjective-expected-utility (SEU) 
model in decision-theory. 
IMDESC Descriptive theory, another family of models is derived from 
empirical data. In this case, the concern is with what g decides and how 
it decides. e.g. what heuristics are used and what is attended to. It is 
therefore process-oriented. Social Psychological and Cognitive 
Psychological models are all in this class. 
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Hybrid theories combine elements of normative with descriptive theory. 
For example, empirical,' data-driven variants of the SEU model, like 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tverky, 1919) and Transaction utility Theory 
(Thaler, 1985) are "hybrids". as are the modern theories of cognitive 
equilibrium in decision-making (Zeleny, 1989). The former have been used 
specifically as foundations for developing prescriptions at the 
aggregate economic or public-policy level (Russell et al, 1989; Frey et 
al 1990) and also, at the level of their local meta-theories, to develop 
some meta-cognitive prescriptions for the strategic behaviour of S 
(section 3, below) 
FIGURE 2. 
NORMATIVE 
Theories 
PRESCRIPTIONS FROM THEORY-TYPES 
[ HYBRIDS ] 
DESCRIPTIVE 
Models 
PRESCRIPTIVE 
Methodologies 
for helping S 
Prescr iptive theory is not so much a "theory" as family of methodologies, 
techniques, tools or principles created fro the sole purpose of helping or 
informing S, as in OR-MS, Systems Analysis, Clinical and Ethical Consultancy 
etc. The particular "prescriptions" derived from normative theory together 
comprise a distinctive set, IPNORM . For example, one prescription in 
NORM * IP is:" Invest in all projects whose calculated IRR ) R" where the 
* value of R is obtained from some model in ~NORM. Alternatively (Figure 
2.) other prescriptions could be associated with the descriptive models in 
The latter precriptions, IP
DESC
, the family are generally oriented 
towards decision-process improvements rather than substantive content. Yet 
other prescriptive methodologies have also evolved through consulting 
experiences, rather than as derivatives of established theories or 
disciplines (e.g. Rosenhead. 1989; Oral, 1981). 
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For strategic re-considerations in the sunk cost context, examples of 
each of these various types of prescription already exist. Taken together, 
however these currently present a somewhat confusing picture, 
in the following section of the article, prescriptions 
Accordingly, 
derived from 
normative theory are first critically reviewed and then re-structured around 
a concept of sunk cost factors. The latter represent the carryover effects 
or latencies inherent in an earlier strategy ~-. Particular attention is 
then paid to the normative "Principle of Ignoring Sunk Costs" (PISC) with 
[MDESC, its several interpretations. For descriptive theory, the associated 
family of prescriptions, IPDESC, then becomes the b' t ft· 3 f su Jec 0 sec lon 0 
the paper where they are compared and contrasted wi th the set 
Against this background of state-of-the-art in prescribing strategy with sunk 
costs, the new conceptual framework of "Strategy as (plural) Rationality" 
is then proposed as a useful alternative paradigm. The new framework yields a 
quite general inquiry procedure for strategic re-considerations, SCID-BAK, 
based upon the set ~BAK of the backward-looking rationalities. Finally, in 
section 5, various conflicts and confusions surrounding PISC are re-cast in 
terms of the several meta-rational arguments linking the set ~BAK with 
prospective or foward-looking forms, like RUM. 
2. NORMATIVE THEORY 
Th t · th f t t . d .. the faml' ly [MNORM, e norma lve eory 0 s ra eglc eC1Slons, consists 
of formal mathematical models that are rigorous, precise, elegant and 
complex, but, in their local meta-theory, quite modest in any claims to 
immediate usefulness. In short, normative theory has some almost spiritual 
qualities. In addition, the normative approach has also yielded some 
testable predictions (including some involving sunk-costs) at the aggregate 
level of economic activity (e.g. Dixit, 1989). 
prescribing strategy for a strategic entity, 
However, its usefulness for 
g , has been seriously and· 
quite widely questioned, especially by some prominent exponents of the 
normative theory (e.g. Grubel, et al, 1986; Kay, 1991; Pindyck, 1991). 
The treatment of sunk costs in normative theory has inherited all of 
these characteristics. The normative Principle of Ignoring Sunk Costs 
(PISC) states that past expenditures by g, at a time tl are "not 
relevant" to investment decisions by g at a later time t 
n 
where n:> 1 , 
This is not to say that the past per se is irrelevant to prescriptive 
l ' t' of [MNORM. app lca lons Far from it. 
that past events and actions of 
The normative theory clearly recognises 
in earlier periods t • with j <: n , 
J 
are all quite relevant and important when specifying the parameters for any 
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of the the models in ~NORM and hence for the model-based prescriptions for 
~+ Specifically. past outlays by g on ~- are explicitly recognised 
within the normative theory (or its local meta theory) as partial causes of 
later events and conditions (e. g. reputation, motivation) in periods t 
k 
wi th k :> n (Figure 3). These events and conditions, in turn, are then 
considered within the theory to impact upon the updated forecasts, revised 
probabili ties and reset hurdle-rates or whatever that characterise ~+ and 
ALT the alternative, [not ~+] with ~ . 
FIGURE 3. 
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SUNK-COST FUTURE 
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NORM There are several specific factors recognised in ~ as comprising 
causal-linkages between g's early strategic behaviour, during ~-, and 
the subsequent evaluation at t of For clari ty, these 
n 
sunk-cast-factors 
sunk-cost-factors. 
may be seperated out into direct and opportunity 
The former, class [1] below, are those seen in the 
normative theory. or its local meta-theory, 
directly. The latter, class [2], impact upon 
as impacting upon 
the evaluation of 
indirectly. via its associated opportunity losses and gains, as follows: 
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[1] DIRECT SUNK-COST FACTORS i.e. events or conditions recognised as 
having been caused by a's behaviour in 1l- and then affecting the 
evaluation of 1l+ directly. 
These factors include a's reputation (Weigelt et al, 1988), learning 
(Tang, 1988), information acquired (Majd et al, 1987), motivation 
(Leibenstein, 1976), and attained competitive position (Talmor, 1992). 
[2] OPPORTUNITY SUNK-COST FACTORS i.e. recognised as having been caused 
by a's behaviour in 1l- and then affecting the direct evaluation of 
[not 1l+] 8. 1lALT the next best alternative to 1l+. (i. e. affecting the 
opportunity costs and benefits of 1l+.) 
These include contractual obligations (Singer et al, 1987) and attained 
asset position (Pappas, 1976) which includes liquidity (in the case of a as 
a firm) and the myopic N.R.V., which is either the estimated direct 
disposal value to a of the assets from 1l- or else the estimated net 
costs to a of a full clean-up of 1l- (see [4] below). Ironically, many 
of these "sunk cost factors" in classes [1] & [2] are often ignored in 
prescriptive strategic analysis based upon the normative theory, when they 
should not be! In addition to these two classes of "sunk cost factors" 
other future events and phenomena, not necessarily seen as causally linked 
to 1l- are also recognised within IMNORM (and the local meta-theory) as 
affecting the forecasts, probabilities or hurdle rates associated with 1l+ . 
These factors may also be seperated out into direct or opportunity subsets, 
as follows: 
[3] DIRECT FUTURE FACTORS i. e. arising in the future, without any 
recognised causal link to a's past behaviour, but impacting upon the 
direct evaluation of 1l+ 
This class of factors delineates the scope and main focus of most 
strategic analysis in practice (e.g. Andrews, 1980). It includes such 
factors as forecast competitor and stakeholder actions (Singer et al, 1990), 
poli tical or legislative factors (Porter, 1980), macroeconomic parameters 
(Haley et al, 1979), technological developments (Porter, 1980; Schwenk et 
al, 1991; Talmor et al, 1992), capital structure & systematic risk (e. g. 
Naylor et al, 1983), 
(Gupta & Rosenhead, 
reversibility and future options associated with 1l+ 
1968; Singer, 1987; Pindyck, 1991) and portfolio 
synergies (Karnani et al, 1985). 
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[4] OPPORTUNITY FUTIJRE FACTORS i. e. 
without any recognised causal link 
recognised as affecting the direct 
[not !J)+] 8; !J)ALT. 
factors arising in the future, 
to g's 
evaluation 
past behaviour, but 
of the alternative, 
Class [4] includes the defensive NRV of the assets from !p- i. e. 
after including such considerations as the potential impact on g of the 
buyer's future use of these assets (Schwenk et al, 1989). It also includes 
. t· . th . 1 h II\ALT -- 11\ dId the Value of wal lng, 1. e. e specla case were t' t'+ e aye 
(McDonald et al, 1986) 
In addition, normative theory has also offered alternatve interpretations 
for a fifth distinctive class [5] of factors, which is actually a strict 
subset of classes [1] - [4]. Factors in class [5] have each been explicitly 
. d . thO \W E IMNORM recognIse WI In some n as affecting the hurdle rates for !p+ . 
Examples of factors in this class are systematic risk, reversibility 8; future 
options, technological change and value of waiting. It now seems quite fair 
to say that there is some implicit double-counting going on within the 
extended normative theories. For example, factors like "rate of 
technological change" have been explictly linked to higher hurdle rates 
(Talmor et al, 1992) whilst they are also implicitly linked to future 
scenarios with their associated (lower) cashflow forecasts and probabilities 
(Schwenk et al, 1989). It is not too hard to find similar examples where a 
content-factor impacts explicitly upon hurdle rates, wi thin a framework of 
marginal analysis, but also implicitly impacts upon the conditonal forecasts 
associated with a considered strategy. 
2.1 Prescriptions from normative theory: the meta-theories. 
The prospects for extracting prescriptive methodologies ~NORM, from the 
normative economic theories, IMNORM have been qui te thoroughly explored 
wi thin the various local and global meta-theories. "Local meta-theory" is 
the sum total of what creators of the models in IMNORM themselves have had 
to say about applying these models to help g in the sunk-cost context. 
They are not optimistic. For example, the local meta-theory states that: 
" ... our optimal investment rule critically depends on (various 
parameters) ... but in fact it may be difficult or impossible to estimate 
them ... " (Majd et al, 1987) 
" parameters ... may not be easy 
opportunity costs can be difficult" 
to measure." 
(Pindyck, 1991). 
" .. measuring these 
" ... one gets an apprehensive feeling about prescribing (rules for 
setting hurdle rates)." (Talmor et al, 1992) 
"1 hope the theoretical treatment deepens economists understanding of 
the issue .. " (Dixit, 1989) 
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Various global meta-theories thoroughly endorse these local caveats. 
IM
NORM The "global meta-theories" of are found in the general literatures 
of OR-MS, Systems, Forecasting and Accountancy. They include: meta-
modelling (Ravetz, 1971: Ackoff, 1981: Mehrez. 1989) meta-systems (Van Gigch, 
1991: Keys, 1988; Jackson, 1990) meta-forecasting (Makridakis, 
MacIntyre, 1984) and meta-OCF (P.Marsh et al, 1988; Pike, 1991). 
1988; 
These meta-theories are strikingly convergent. They all distinguish 
problem-types and appropriate problem-solving methodologies. They all 
distinguish "strategic" problems involving complex and chaotic 
cognitive-social-economic processes from other types of "tactical" problem. 
involving known or well-defined objects of choice (Table 1). 
TABLE 1. STRATEGIC & OTHER PROBLEM-TYPES 
Problem-Types Meta-Theory 
STRATEGIC OTHERS 
practical technical Ravitz. (1971) 
wicked tame Rittel & Webber, (1973) 
ambiguous unambiguous Marsh, (1978) 
problem mess Ackoff, (1979 ) 
systemic mechanical Ackoff, (1981) 
unclear clear Ellon, (1985 ) 
unprogrammed programmed Simon, (1987) 
conundrum puzzle Hollis (1987 ) 
human [mechanistic] Wagner (1990) 
primary secondary Langley (1991) 
etc. 
In addition to all of this, meta-forecasting research (Makrdakis, 1989; 
MacIntyre, 1984) has demonstrated that the available methodologies for 
forecasting key-performance-parameters (costs, benefits, sales, etc.) for the 
strategic entity a are quite unreliable. Forecasts at the level of the 
strategic entity are distinguished in the meta-theory of forecasting from 
aggregate or systemic-level forecasts such as actuarial or demographic 
projections, as the latter may sometimes be based upon quite deeply 
understood statistical processes. 
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Research into the actual use and effectiveness of forecast-based capital 
budgeting techniques, meta-DCF , is fully in agreement with meta-forecasting 
research. Meta-DCF simply confirms that forecasts of cashflows constitu~ a 
"barrier" to effective prescriptive application of theDCF models in (MNORH. 
Such forecasts are, to quote from 
difficult" (Marsh et al, 1988), 
"inadequa te" (Pruitt et al, 1981) 
the global meta-theory: "extremely 
"impossible" (Crum et al. 1986), 
and "unreliable" when produced in a 
controlled experient (Ang et al, 1919). Despite the widespread reported use 
of DCF (e. g. Pike, 1991) no one has ever felt able to publish even one 
real-life DCF analysis for a strategic corporate investment which has 
subequently turned out. ex post. to be correct 0. e. where the forecasts 
associated with V or V+ were accurate. or where. on publicising the plan, 
the equity value of the firm actually increased by the ex ante calculated NPV 
of V. ) 
In sum, the convergent meta theories are now telling us that attempts to 
, 
prescribe strategy for e, using the techniques derived from normative 
models, have not been particularly successful. Where strategic analysis 
makes use of normative theory in practice, the prescriptive models and 
NORK • techniques in IP eVIdently perform quite a variety of unorthodox 
observed roles, as summarised in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. UNORTHODOX ROLES OF IN THE STRATEGY PROCESS 
Techniques derived from normative theory act as ••. 
A RITUAL ... reinforcing a culture of (strong instrumental) 
rationali ty, or sustaining and orientation towards a 
goal of value creation (Gimpl & Dakin, 1984). 
GLUE: ... binding or uniting managers behind a common set of 
concepts, practices, goals or strategies (Langley, 
1991 ). 
BATTERIES ... a source of motivation. Analysis per se acts 
psychologically to increase involvement and commitment 
and to reduce perceived risk (Langer, 1915). 
STATUS-SYMBOL: Access to the calculations displays status in the 
organization. This has also been observed with economic 
forecasts "used" in strategic analysis (Eerola. 1989). 
PLIERS: They are used to extract confessions from subordinates 
concerning their assumptions about strategy, or to 
squeeze subordinates into line when they oppose the 
strategy of the dominant coalition (Marsh et al. 1988). 
A ROUND-TABLE They simply provide a useful forum for discussion of 
strategic issues (Bennett et al, 1985). 
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This last role of "round table" (Table 2 above) is particularly 
like DCF-NPV are IP
NORH significant. Evidence suggests that techniques in 
often used in practice simply to activate the content of a strategic 
decision. Put differently, they help a to identify decision content by 
inviting (not directing) attention within a to the substantive decison 
factors like those in classes U] - [4]. It follows that any number of 
alternative methodologies (either associated with IMDEse or else ad hoc) 
could potentially do a rather better Job of content-activation via the 
regulation or direction of attentional processes within a. The models in 
IMNORH , whilst used for this purpose, were never intended or designed for it. 
Thus even Figure 3 (above) together with the specified factors in classes [1] 
to [4], could itself help a to cognitively structure its strategic 
re-considerations, or help a to better formulate strategy with sunk-costs. 
Figure 3, with its detailed description, is simply a non-mathematical 
; 
IP
NORH
• summary of the rather dysfunctional family 
3. DESCRIPTIVE MODELS 
Several other models of strategy with sunk cost, IM
DEse
, are all 
descriptive rather than normative. 
evidence, including evidence of 
That is, they are shaped around empirical 
the behavioural violations of PISCo 
• DEse Descriptlve models M e 1M therefore characterise strategic choices by 
a with at least some references to a's past strategic behaviour. The 
various processes and prescriptions associated with the models 
set out in Table 3, below. 
DESC 
M' e 1M are 
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE MODELS OF STRATEGY WITH SUNK COSTS. 
Mode 1 M e IMDEse 
I 
Major Theme in M 
I 
Slaw (1980) 
H 
2 
White (1986) 
CognItIve, Social: Justificalion, norms 
of consistency, cognitive biases in 
Judgemental forecasts. 
CognItive: Below-expectation performance 
in 1>- triggers framIng in the domain 
of losses for decisions by l!I at t . 
n 
ThIs causes risk-seeking behaviour, with 
a preference for options that make 
possible a return to the status quo 
ante. 
Associated prescription for 
-- set pr·ior 11m! ts on outlays etc, 
-- . use different decision making 
subsystems, or tacit approval only. 
-- consciously compensate for systematic 
biases. 
-- be aware of this effect of framing, 
in order to avoid exposure to the 
downs ide of "r Isk-seeking" . 
predict or expect risk-seeking 
behaviour by others, following their 
below - expectation performance. 
~----------~------------------------------------~--------------------------------~& 
cont ••. 
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TABLE 3. cont. 
H 
:] 
Bowen (1987) 
Wernefelt 8. 
Kamanl (1987) 
"5 
Schwenk 8. 
Tang (1989) 
Bateman (1989) 
General: Information about 1>- Is often 
unreliable, ambiguous, equivocal; 
General: qualitative, content-oriented 
Cognl tIve, -Soc1al content: 
Interpretation of Economic factors 
mediated by a's cognitive processes. 
CognitIve 8. General : Failure feedback 
triggers a frame for re-considerations. 
"Slack" prevents a from following 
pliORII • 
Prescript.ions from "descriptive" models 
-- be aware of that some situations 
lack hard decision critena. 
-- be cautious about labelling decisions 
as "errors" ex post because "objective" 
assessment impossible ex ante. 
-- be aware that past investments 
influence optimal strategic timing (i.e 
delaying 1>+). 
-- be aware that past investments are 
footholds (1. e. attained market pow~r) 
or windows (I.e sources of information) 
comply with HI (Staw, 1980) 
prescriptions. 
-- be aware of factors in class [1] & 
[21. 
cost 
specifically (a) 
reductions (b) 
learning curve 
forthcoming new 
technologies (c) non-myopic NRVs, in 
[not 1>+1 i.e. defensive strategy. 
-- compensate for framing effects. 
consider influencing others by 
inducing frames. 
-- conceptualize "time as a stream" in 
strategic decisions 8. re-consideratlons, 
The various models in Table 2. above each combine elements of economic 
decision content (like 
organizational 
interpretions 
However, the 
processes, 
of IMDESC , 
set IP
DESC 
forecasts) 
within 9. 
with 
On the 
specified 
face of 
cognitive &-or 
it, prescriptive 
for helping 9, risk confusing is wi th ought. 
of prescriptions simply flows from several 
IM
DESC
, assumptions, embedded in the meta-theory of about what could be 
process improvements for strategic re-considerations. For example, if 
empirical evidence indicates systematic (optimistic) biases in forecasts, or 
specific framing-effects in decision-making (e.g. M, M ) then it is argued 
1 6 
in the local meta-theory that 9 should consciously attempt to counter such 
DESC "bias" and "effects". Put differently the prescriptions from 1M mostly 
involve meta-cognitive activity within 9. Various existing prescriptions of 
this type are set out above in Table 3 (column 2). These may be further 
summarised, as follows: 
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1. S should ... 
(i) Take into account various specified content factors in strategic 
re-considerations, particularly those sunk cost factors in class [1] 
(section 2 above). 
(ii) Educate and train (subsystems) to counter the effect of cognitve 
bias, frames and mis-applied cognitive heuristics. 
(iii) Employ internal control tactics, including: setting prior limi ts 
(at t on various measures associated with !p Different 
o 
decision-makers (for !p- and !p+ ); Tacit approval only (of !p- ); 
improved reporting procedures. 
2. Researchers and-or S should ... 
(i) Re-think the traditional future-oriented planning framework. 
(ii) View strategic decisions within a "time stream" as distinct from a 
future-orientation. 
FIGURE 4. 
Prescriptions for 
Aggregate-level 
Economic Policy 
!M
NORH 
GENERIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
_ - - - Local 8. Global 
Meta-Theories 
# DEVELOP NEW 
THEORY 
L [ HYBRIDS 1 # ENRICH the CONTENT (within techniques) 
IPDESC 
r-- # ENRICH the CONTENT # IMPROVE the PROCESS .# DEVELOP NEW THEORY '----__ --l 
~ PRESCRIPTIVE 
Methodologies 
for helping S 
~ ~ IPNORII techniques 
have unorthodox 
roles 
Combining IPNORM (section 2) with (section 3) now leaves 
with the following three broad categories (Figure 4) of model-based 
prescriptions for guiding strategic re-considerations: 
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Category 1. ENRICH the CONTENT: Richly define the strategic alternatives 
(the formal objects-of-choice). Include consideration and analysis of the 
various content-factors in classes [1] - [4]. The factors in [1], moreover, 
can only be characterised with some reference to V-. 
Category 2. IMPROVE the PROCESS: Implement the meta -cognitive, training & 
control processes, from DESC I? ,and .... 
Category 3. DEVELOP NEW THEORY: Search for alternative or complementary 
frameworks and paradigms from which to derive prescriptions for strategic 
re-considerations by g. 
One development within the latter category, i. e. new or complementary 
theories and frameworks, is now outlined in the next section of the paper. 
4. COMPLEMENTARY FRAMEWORKS 
Alternative prescriptive methodologies for strategic decisions in general 
are not at all hard to find (Rosenhead, 1989; Oral, 1987). Like I?DESC, many 
such methodologies (e.g. COPE, SODA, DA-DI, Strategic Choice etc.) are 
process-oriented, targeting organizational and cognitive processes rather 
than any particular set of content-factors. They do not specifiy decision 
content a priori, rather they are oriented towards an integration or 
synthesis of strategy content with strategy process (Rosenhead, 1989; 
Pennings, 1985). Put differently, holistic methodologies are now needed that 
treat the strategic entity 9 as an economic actor and at the same time a 
cognitive system, so that prescriptive techniques should somehow link the 
cognition-of-economics to an economy-of-cognition, in 9 
Fishburn, 1991). 
(Bourgine, 1989; 
The new conceptual framework of "Strategy as Rationality" represents but 
one small 
technique 
step in this general direction. 
(Singer, 1992a, b) may now also 
Its associated sera inquiry 
be applied to strategic 
re-considerations in the sunk cost context, simply by focussing more closely 
on the backward-looking subset of the plural rationalities ~BAK c ~. 
Strategy-Yith-Sunk-Costs as Backward-Looking-Rationality 
In the new conceptual framework, The rationality of the strategic entity 
9 is no longer conceived of as any particular well-defined preference 
structure. Instead, 9 (whether a firm, coalition, individual, planner, or 
wha tever ) is seen to be not only a RUM agent, not only a bounded, 
expressive or contextually rational agent, but as plurally-rational, 
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according to the various problem contexts in its perceived "Multiverse" 
(Zeleny. 1992). Specifically, a strategy-set S is placed in one-to-one 
isomorphic correspondence with a rationality-set fR whose elements are the 
many distinctive forms of rationality r E fR. The strategic entity is then 
conceptualized as a plurally rational agent (Figure 5). 
FIGURE 5. STRATEGY AS RATIONALITY: AN ISOMORPHISM 
SmATEGY 
CONCEPTS 
9 E S 
SmATEGIC 
ENTITY 
Isomorph1sm 
I nATIONALITY ==================~I CONCEPTS 
r E !R 
~(----~) s: 
With this framework in place, the transition from general problems and 
mysteries of strategy (e. g. handling sunk costs in strategic 
re-considerations). to general problems of rationality (e.g. a hUman or even 
a wasp abandoning a "personal" plan) and vice versa (from rationality to 
strategy) then becomes completely straightfoward, uninhibited and rather 
productive. Advances in one field (i.e. in the general theory of rationality 
or of strategy) then directly informs and potentially enriches the other. 
"Strategy as Rationality" yields a simple inquiry procedure, a set of 
questions flowing naturally and directly from the various distinctive r e fR 
that are intended to direct a comprehensive meta-cognitive re-structuring 
of S's decision processes. Put simply, rather than have S ask: "How can 
S maximise utility", or "How can S overcome problems of slack, bias or 
mis-applied heuristic rules", the SCIO inquiry procedure now asks 
questions corresponding to all of the r E fR. In the sunk cost context of 
strategic re-considerations, this means that the SCIO approach can then 
BA':' enrich strategic inquiry with reference to the subset !R c !R of the 
backward-looking rationalities (Figure 7). 
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FIGURE 6. META-COGNITIVE INQUIRY FROM BACKWARD-LOOKING RATIONALITY 
~. 
--
RE-
CONS IDEilATI ON 
of t>+ by It! 
at [t ] 
n 
Plural-Rational1ty, IR Prescription for 
E; Backward-looklng- - - - -)- - - INQUIRY procedure 
rationalities IRBAK c IR by a 
The set IRBAK c IR 
The set IRBAK contains all those forms of rationality I" E IR that are 
defined with some direct reference to the past; the history of the agent a, 
or others. 
IR
BAK
:: {posterior, deliberative, selected, adaptive, open, quasi, 
ratchet, retrospective. constrained, resolute, contextual, etc. } 
These forms share the common property that decisions and actions are 
characterised as "rational" only with some explicit reference to past 
history. Each r E IRBAK is described below with an associated 
(meta-cognitive) inquiry for ~. Thus the rationalities themselves, (not 
models) can, in this way, directly yield a prescriptive tool or technique. 
The full set of rationality-based questions then comprises a (non-optimising) 
inquiry system for strategic re-considerations. 
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The SCIO-BAK inquiry 
First, consider those particular backward-looking forms that are 
themselves foundations of specific theories in the socio-economic sciences. 
These include: ratchet, adaptive, posterior, selected, quasi, retrospective 
forms. Each of these forms yields a simple inquiry that is, inevitably, 
rather similar to the prescriptions (in IPNORM or IPDESC ) that have also been 
read into the corresponding aggregate-level theories. For example, in the 
case of Leibenstein's (1976) aggregate level theory of X-efficiency, the 
associated prescriptions at the level of ~, discussed by Leibenstein, could 
also be read into the underlying rationality postulates (selected, ratchet) 
that were set out as the theory's foundation. Each of the above-mentioned 
rationali ties r E !RBAK 
~, is set out below: 
with its corresponding meta-cognitive inquiry for 
RATCHET: experiences inertia, takes into account cogni ti ve costs of 
reconsideration and the benefits to ~ of co-ordication with others. 
etc. (Leibenstein, 1976). 
Inquiry: (i) What is the optimal timing and frequency of re-considerations? 
(ii) Does a choice of [not V+ 1 & VALT imply damage to ~' s 
reputation, violation of 
co-ordination with others? 
trust in ~, or loss of S's 
ADAPTIVE: ~ incrementally updates past rules (March, 1978; Ansoff, 1991). 
Inquiry: Does the experience with V- Justify adjustments to S's policy 
guidelines, or other decision criteria. 
POSTERIOR: ~'s goals are emergent, or interpretations of past actions by ~. 
(Marsh, 1978) 
Inquiry: 
SELECTED: 
What are ~'s goals now? Reformulate strategic goals in the light 
of V-. 
S adopts rules because of their survival value in the past. The 
past competitive environment is the source of behavioural rules for 
S (Marsh 1978; Hannan & Freeman 1977). 
Inquiry: (i) Will a habit and reputation of perSistence (in similar 
situatons) make ~ vulnerable to competitors with different 
strategies? (ii) Is there a risk to ~ of a war of attrition (in 
the market for V+ outputs)? 
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QUASI: 
Inquiry: 
9 makes choices in accordance with Prospect Theory &~or Transaction 
~Utility-Theory. In either case, choices depend on the past behavior 
of majority of (or typical) subjects (Kahneman et al , 1979; Thaler, 
1985) . 
What would the majority of g's decide if they were in this 
situat ion? 
RETROSPECTIVE: 9 assesses cost of violating the social norm of consistency, 
the benefit of being able to justify past decisions and actions of 
9 (Staw, 1980). 
Inquiry: (i) If ~+ is changed, abandoned, will 9 be perceived (by 9 or 
others) as inconsistent? (ii) Can a Justification of ~+ be 
communicated. (iii) Have psychological biases (in forecasts for 
~+) been allowed for? 
A further subset of the backward looking rationalities 
may now also be identified. The various rationalities 
IM
DESC
• directly associated with any extant models in 
IR
BAK* r E are not 
Put differently, if 
n ( M ) is the decision function rationality of a model. M (Morecroft, 1983; 
) IRBAK* C IRBAK Singer 1991 then the subset defined as 
= 
is a non-empty set. 
u n ( M ) } 
IM DESC K E 
The subset IRBAK* contains the following backward-looking rationalities: 
deliberative, contextual, open, constrained, resolute. 
underdeveloped in the sense that there is not yet any 
Each of these is 
formal aggregate 
IR
BAK* socio-economic theory based upon that form. Yet the set now has the 
potential to further extend meta-cognitive inquiry, at the level of g. This 
step, in particular, represents one of the ways in which rational ity can 
inform strategy within the wider conceptual framework of Singer (1992a). 
The various r E IRBAK* with their corresponding inquiries, are as follows: 
DELIBERATIVE: 9 's goals are emergent, as learned capacities and potentials 
of g. (Rawls, 1972) 
Inquiry: Does ~+ utilise to the full S's newly-learned capabilities 
(competencies, capacities) developed during ~- ? 
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OPEN: 
Inquiry: 
~ undertakes thorough or complete learning from past mistakes of 
~ and others (Popper, 1989). 
Have all mistakes in the history of V- been fully investigated 
and corrected? 
CONTEXTUAL: ~ should take actions oriented to maintaining institutions and 
Inquiry: 
tradi tions that express a "good life with others" 
(Habermas, 1984). 
Is V+ part of a grand strategy V involving "the creation or 
maintenance of traditions or institutions that express ~'s 
vision of the good life with others"? 
CONSTRAINED: It is not rational to abandon a long-standing personal plan for 
the sake of a newly-formed current ( t ) preference (Slote, 
n 
Inquiry: 
RESOLUTE: 
Hence ask: 
1989) . 
(i) Is completion of V a long-standing unfulfilled mission of 
~? (11) If V+ changed, abandoned, will ~ be perceived (by 
others) as weak, and unreliable? (iii) Is continuation of V+ 
an opportuni ty for ~ to develop lasting habits (of 
task-completion) conferring future benefits? 
~ should sometimes adopt an overall plan, at t k < n , 
k 
that is expected to include a subsequent formally-dominated 
choice. ~ 's preferences will then subsequently be reshaped to 
respond to these already-adopted plans. Thus ~ should maximise 
"globally" over a life-span (McClennan, 1989). 
If V+ considered in isolation fails, at t , on the updated 
n 
criteria, was this situation foreseen in original evaluation of 
V? (ii) Is V+ part of a plan V that distribute benefits to ~ 
over an extended time? 
If these questions based upon backward-looking rationalities are attended 
to, together with the various content factors identified in the normative 
theory with its local meta-theory (i.e. in classes [1] to [4]) then a rather 
holistic and qualitative methodology, "SCIO-BAK" has now emerged for helping 
~ in strategic re-considerations. The inquiry system simply scans the total 
set of rationales for action based upon historically located knowledge and 
wisdom, whilst the substantive decision-content is systematically accessed by 
the summarised family ~NORM (section 2 above). 
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This methodology extends )t{' s rationality whilst it can also help )t{ 
to avoid a local rationality •. the neglect of key factors and rationales in 
strategic decisions (Glazer et al, 1992). More generally, as an alternative 
prescriptive approach, SCIO-BAK also fares quite well on the six "desirable 
characteristics for an alternative paradigm" proposed by Rosenhead (t 989). 
Specifically, SCIO-BAK is: (i) non-optimising for SUbstantive outcomes, 
(il) it has minimal data demands, (iii) it is simple, (iv) it 
conceptualises )t{ as an active inquiring system, and (v) it does not view 
)t{ as a hierarchy. Finally, (vi) the approach is especially oriented towards 
clarifying the terms of conflict in the strategy process, a point that is 
now made quite explicit in the remaining section of the paper. 
5. HETA-RATIONALITY & PISC 
Meta-rational arguments lie at the very heart of many conflicting 
model-based prescriptions widely discussed in the general strategy literature 
(Singer, 1991). In particular psychological and strategic conflicts 
IM
NORM associated with the principle of ignoring sunk costs (PISC) in can now 
also be recast in terms of some general meta-rational arguments linking the 
backward-looking rationali ties, e (RBAK with the forward-looking 
rationalities like RUN. 
FIGURE 7. CONFLICTING PRESCRIPTIONS AS META-RATIONAL ARGUMENTS 
Conflicting 
prescriptions 
(for treatment 
of Bunk cOBtS) 
DCF with 
PISC 
SCIO 
I--------t) R. U. N. 
c 
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IR 
Heta-rati90al. 
arguments & principles 
Whereas models like DCF-NPV in IMNORM embrace PISC as part of the 
meta-theory, alternative techniques like SCIO-BAK explicitly refer to many 
aspects of the past history of S, so, like the choices of the basketball fan 
in Thaler's (1985) famous example of PISC-violation, the SCIO-BAK technique 
also appears to be prescribing violations of PISCo Like other model-based 
conflicts, this one can also be re-cast in terms of general meta-rational 
arguments in RBAK x RUM. To make this quite explicit, the concept of the 
decision-function-rationality D(H) of a model M (Morecroft, 1983) is once 
again rather useful, as illustrated in Figure 7. With this framework in 
place, the various meta-rational arguments linking the r E RBAK with RUM, 
outlined in Table 3 below, then reveal the complex multi-dimensional nature 
of any solution to the strategic mysteries surrounding PISCo 
1. 
TABLE 3. META-RATIONAL ARGUMENTS LINKING RBAK WITH RUM. 
ENRICHED DESCRIPTIONS: For RUM, the description of Objects-Of Choice 
must be "rich enough", possibly including factors causally linked 
to the past (exactly as depicted in terms of strategy in Figure 
3, above). 
2. OPTIMALITY: Within an economy-of-cogni tion, S should seek (i) opt imal 
rationality i.e to balance non-forecastability against 
rule-worship. (ii) optimal inertia i.e. have triggered or timed 
re-considerations, or else some policy of non-reconsideration. 
(iii) an evolutionary-optimum: at some level of evolved 
intelligence, the benefits of additional intelligence are 
insufficient to justify the extra cost of sensory and nervous 
equipment, for S. 
3. CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHERS: Inertia brings benefits of stability and 
clarity, increasing payoffs in many situations involving others. 
This works through S's ability to enlist others, or to act as 
role model, because S's intentions are always partly apparent 
to others. 
4. CO-ORDINATION WITH SELF: Maximise lifetime-utility for S, A resolute 
(persistent) strategy generally enables development of more 
advanced capabilities and competencies. Therefore S should 
invest in a generalised capability for being resolute. 
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5. EVOLUTIONARY STABILTY: If every g (in a population or aggregate system) 
was a foward-Iooking utility-maximiser with respect to external 
rewards or prizes, then much time & effort would be wasted in 
long fights against others in a population for the "prizes" 
widely perceived as valuable. Such a population could be 
displaced by another that, for example, decides whether to fight 
by tossing a coin (Dawkins 1980). 
6. INSTITUTIONS: Institutions are historically located and they also 
express or communicate values. Expressive actions cannot be 
reduced to RUM (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap 1989). 
In sum, the wisdom inherent in apparent violations of PISC by g is 
made quite explicit by these meta-rational arguments. Since g cannot be 
certain about preferences for 
strategic choice (tl+ versus 
the partially defined uncertain objects of 
[not tl+ ] 8& tlALT) a generalised appeal to 
alternative principles of rationality that cannot necessarily be comandeered 
by RUM, is simply one distinctive form of wisdom in strategic decisions. 
7. SUMMARY 8& CONCLUSION 
Several prescriptions for strategic re-considerations flow from existing 
normative and descriptive models. These have been summarised in sections 2 & 
3. The conceptual framework of Strategy-as-Rationality then extends this 
family of prescriptions, by viewing g as a plurally-rational agent whose 
decision processes reflect, at some procedural level, the full set of the 
backward-looking rationalities. The associated SCIO-BAK inquiry procedure 
is then designed to activate meta-cognitive processes corresponding to 
plurally-rational choice. In the new framework, the linkages with normative 
theory (via RUM E IR) simply serve to draw attention to the full set of 
"normatively"-important content factors, including the various 
sunk-cast-factors (i.e. classes [1) & [4]) that are explicitly recognised in 
[M
NORK or the local meta-theory. 
In conclusion, it is now quite apparent that strategic re-considerations 
by g, like other forms of plurally-rational choice, take place within a 
"Multiverse" of content and process, future and past, intention and action, 
self and others. It follows that researchers in the general field of 
strategy (e.g. Ansoff, 1991 versus Mintzberg, 1991) should not themselves 
* persist with old paradigms tl that neglect at least some of these 
dimensions, just because they themselves have done so in the past. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STRA TEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND PLURAL RATIONALITY 
To appear as a book chapter, AE Singer, "Plural rationalities and 
strategic intelligence", in Global Perspectives on Competitive Intelligence 
edited by JE Prescott, Copyrighted by the Society of Competitive 
Intelligence Professionals (U.S.A.). forthcoming in 1992-3. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter outlines some new methodologies for competitive and 
strategic analysis that are based upon recent developments in the general 
theory of rational decisions. Some consideration is given to the scope of 
application and potential for abuse of existing methodologies, then some new 
techniques are introduced. Attention is particularly drawn to to several 
questions, associated with plural rationalities, that intelligence analysts 
should be routinely asking; firstly, about the various techniques of 
strategic analysis and secondly, about competitor firms or intelligence 
targets. Answers are not provided here to these questions, nor is there a 
discussion of techniques for acquiring competitive intelligence information. 
The latter professional activities, together with the associated ethical 
judgements, are left to the reader. 
In the first part of the chapter, a device is described for screening 
general theories and models of competition, with respect to their potential 
value for business intelligence analysis. The device consist of six simple 
questions designed to draw analyst's attention to some typical limitations of 
many of these theories (Singer and Brodie, 1990). The next section of the 
chapter outlines a variant of the SCIO technique of strategic analysis. 
"SCIa" stands for Specifying Canonical Issues and Options (it also means "I 
know" in Latin). The techniques capture an ancient idea about decision 
making that has been somewhat neglected in modern planning practice. It is 
simply an adaptation of the philosophical principle of continence. According 
to that principle, a rational agent (planner, analyst) should strive to hold 
in mind the maximum possible number of "reasonably relevant" considerations, 
when trying to evaluate actions (or to make predictions). In order to achieve 
continence, intelligence-analysts generally need mnemonics, not mathematics. 
The variants of SCIa are innovative in using the plural rationalities 
themselves as a classification scheme, or mnemonic, to directly aid strategic 
decision-making. The emphasis is placed upon accessing relevant knowledge, 
but with "relevance" determined in advance by normative criteria of 
rationality, rather than vague personal reflection. The version of SeIa set 
out here (SCIa-CaMP) is specifically directed to business competitor 
analysis, i.e. understanding and forecasting the strategic behaviour of some 
specifiedcompeti tor or other firm. The key innovation in this version of 
SCIa is a view of competitor firms as a plurally-rational-agents. A set of 
questions, or directions for competitor analysis, flow quite naturally from 
this perspective. 
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The chapter ends with a discussion of some recent progress towards using 
the concept of potential performance in strategic analysis. New quantitative 
techniques and decision-support methodologies (e.g., Oral, 1986, 1987) have 
captured an emerging theme in economic theory (e.g. Leibenstein, 1976; 
Hargreaves-Heap 1989) that loosely associates rational action with the 
realisation of potential. This form of rationality and the related techniques 
enable the strategic planner to partly avoid the many problems associated 
with forecasting in complex and volatile socio-economic systems. 
2. HYPER-RATIONALITY AND COMPETITION 
Despi te these problems, understanding and possibly even predicting the 
strategic behavior of specified competitors remains a major goal of the 
competitive intelligence process. This activity has now become an important 
component of strategic analysis, as the contemporary competitive environment 
of the firm often consists of just a few major players (or strategic groups). 
Traditional models of competition in the economics and marketing literatures 
have been criticised as being "almost useless" for this sort of practical 
competitor analysis (e.g .• Henderson, 1983). One must therefore ask why this 
could be so, and what alternative theoretical approaches have the potential 
to contribute to the competitive intelligence function. 
There are obvious risks in borrowing ideas about competition from other 
domains of social enquiry and then applying them to the business analysts' 
task. For example, the prospects for deriving good techniques from biological 
theory, such as population-ecology models, are limited by some basic 
differences in sUbject-matter. To start with, organisations or firms have 
few properties in common with biological populations; secondly, the 
competitive behavioural repertoire of organisations bears little structural 
resemblance to that of populations. In addition, business competitor 
analysis, unlike biology, is an activity conducted from the perspective of an 
industry participant. 
Similar limitations constrain the predictive and explanatory power of any 
given theory or model of competition. Since these limitations are themselves 
of some importance to intelligence analysts, they should be made rather more 
explicit and obvious. To this end, a total of six basic criteria (including 
those above) were proposed in Singer and Brodie (1990) for use as a 
preliminary screening or evaluation device, for theories and models of 
competition, from the point of view of a business intelligence analyst. These 
six criteria are: 
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(1) Information about competitors: both current and historical 
information should be taken into account. 
(2) Nature of the competitors: they should be organisations, not 
individuals, organisms or populations. 
(3) Nature of behaviors analysed: corporate as well as marketing 
strategies should be in the repertoire. 
(4) Participant perspective: emphasis should be on the target's strategic 
behavior, rather than the competitive process as a whole. 
(5) Decision content: the content (factors, issues) of the target's 
deliberations over strategy should be represented in some form. 
(6) Decision process: the target's decision processes and internal 
politics should be represented in some form. 
Theories, models and techniques of competitive strategic analysis may be 
screened using these criteria. Five examples are briefly discussed in this 
section, in order to illustrate the approach. They are: Oligopoly theory, 
Structural analysis, Hypergames, Political process models and Attributuion 
research. (For further examples, 22 altogether, refer to Singer and Brodie, 
1990) . 
Oligopoly Theory is OK on criteria 2, and 5 but not on 1, 3, 4, 6: 
Whilst this theory is related to econometric techniques of forecasting 
it does not purport to predict the strategic behavior of specified 
firms as players. It simply offers game-theoretic equilibria as 
benchmarks; but it must be noted that these equilibria reflect a 
specific and rather narrow assumption about the form of rationality of 
the players. 
Structural and value chain analysis. (Porter, 1980, 1985) is intended 
for self-analysis (understanding the competitive position) or for 
understanding the position of specified competitors. In either context 
it is OK on criteria 1-5 but conspicuously fails on criterion 6. That 
is, it tends to neglect behavioral and political perspectives, with the 
associated distinction between intended and realised strategies. 
Conversely, organisational and political prcess models, taken in 
isolation, tend to neglect the content of competitor's decisions (i.e. 
the salient strategic issues as perceived by the competitor). That is, 
they fail on criterion 5. 
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Two other approaches that do involve player's beliefs in a competitive 
context are attribution research and hyergaming. 
Corporate attributions: One stream of research has focused on corporate 
attributions (in speeches and annual reports) and the interpretation of 
stated corporate objectives (e.g. ,Salancik and Meindle, 1984; 
O'Shaunessy, 1984). However, this approach also remains silent on the 
real content of the target's decisions (criterion 5). 
The Hyper-game approach (Bennet and Huxham, 1982) accomodates the idea 
that players perceptions of the payoffs could differ in a game of 
strategy. It is an attempt to represents the cognitive empathy between 
game-players by explicitly representing their beliefs and goals, albeit 
in a rather crude form. Bennet (1980) points out that this type of 
complexity is a minimal requirement for predicting the outcome of 
strategic interactions. Whilst the hypergame approach is distinctive in 
combining an explicit treatment of cognitive, strategic and instrumental 
rationalities into a single decision-aiding device, it nevertheless 
rates rather poorly on criteria 1 (information about the 
players ... personalities, cultures, etc.) and 4 (target's behavioral 
repertoire) . 
Proponents of these (and many other) approaches have themselves often 
stressed that the various theories, models and analytic techniques are not 
intended to be comprehensive nor definitive. In practice they are often 
regarded as good frameworks for organised discussion and for the structuring 
of jUdgements. They are not algorithms for generating explicit solutions to 
the strategic problem of the firm. In fact, to expect the latter from any 
particular theoretical approach is simply to run the risk of 
paralysis-by-analysis, or hyper-rationality. The theme of "structured 
judgement" in the competitive analysis context is pursued a little further in 
the following section, where the SCIO-COMP technique is now described. 
3. SCIO-COMP : COMPETITOR ANALYSIS 
The several variants of the SCIO technique each have quite modest aims. 
Each is designed to improve the quality of strategic decisions essentially by 
extending the scope of activated knowledge, whilst at the same time lending a 
structure to the policy dialogue that parallels the structure of plurally-
rational choice. As with all other techniques of decision analysis, there is 
some danger that individual personalities, power-related manouveuring and 
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political prejudices might intervene to truncate or unbalance the SCrO-based 
policy dialogue. Put differently, scro is not guaranteed to withstand 
organisational intrigue. 
The version of SCIO specifically used for competitor-analysis is rather 
less vulnerable to internal politics. This is because intelligence activity 
like competitor analysis is a relatively detached process, somewhat akin to 
preparing an economic forecast. That is, it is simply an input to the 
strategy process. The SCIO philosophy may be applied to the task of 
understanding and predicting the strategic behavior of a specified competitor 
firm. This is an important task in the contemporary business environment, 
where the competition often amounts to a few major players (or strategic 
groups) . 
In this competitor analysis context, a view of the intelligence target as 
a plurally-rational-agent facilitates the interpretation of current and 
historical intelligence information. With this perspective, information on 
such factors as market position, cost structures, power relationships, 
management profiles, etc. may be coupled to considerations flowing from the 
plural rationalities, such as: (a) the identity-preservation motive, (b) 
communicative acts (signals and promotions) (c) the possibility of 
precommitment or self-binding behaviors (d) goals and motivation (e) 
distribution of cognitive resources and heuristic use (f) language use (g) 
blind-spots, hot-spots and the structure of core organisational beliefs. 
The SCIQ-COMP approach to competitor analysis can be made much more 
explicit by directly associating forms of rationality with counterpart 
concepts in organisational strategy (Singer 1991b) and then deriving simple 
questions, from these linkages, that should be systematically researched and 
reflected upon by the intelligence analyst. These questions, to be asked 
about the target competitor organisation, are listed in Table 1, below. They 
define many directions for enquiry that flow directly from the assumption 
that the target is a single plurally-rational agent. (Note that the questions 
in Table 1, below, are about the target organisation, whereas those in 
chapter one were about models and techniques) 
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TABLE 1. SCIO-COMP: DIRECTIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT PRESCRIBED BY A 
VIEW OF THE COMPETITOR FIRM AS A PLURALLY-RATIONAL AGENT. 
(a) Competitor's beliefs (belief-rationalities) 
1. WHAT ARE C's EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OUR MOVES? 
Possibilites for strategic surprise. 
2. DOES C USE EXTRAPOLATORY FORECASTING? 
Use Cs past sales data to mimic. 
3. DOES C USE CONVENTIONAL TEMPLATE PLANNING? 
Role-play. extrapolate available data. 
4. DOES C USE SOPHISTICATE MODEL-BASED FORECASTING SYSTEM? 
Can it be duplicated or reconstructed? 
5. DOES C CONDUCT ROUTINE EX-POST REVIEWS OF OPERATIONS? 
Identify C's past errors and expect C to avoid repetition. 
6. ARE ANY OF C'S APPARENT BELIEFS (OR STATEMENTS) INCONSISTENT? 
Expect eventual revision and refinement of those beliefs. 
7. DO C'S RECENT ACTIONS INDICATE "BLIND-SPOTS"? 
Can these be predicted or exploited? 
(b) Competitor's calculations (means-rationalities) 
8. DOES C HAVE A RECORD OF ACTIONS BASED ON NON-OBVIOUS INFERENCES? 
(EG. SUCCESSFUL FIRST MOVES) 
Expect future intelligent strategies. 
9. IS C USING A MODEL-BASED STRATEGY-SELECTION SYSTEM? 
Can the model be identified and reconstructed. 
10. WHAT ARE C's POLICY RULES AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES? 
Identify. use role-playing. 
11. IS FLEXIBILITY EVIDENT IN C's STRATEGIC POSITION? 
(cf. Aaker and Mascarenhas. 1984) 
If flexible then easier to deter. influence. 
12. HAS C POSTPONED STRATEGIC MOVES. (I) TO PERMIT CLARIFICATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS (II) TO CORRECT INTERNAL DEFICIENCIES? 
Propensity to postpone in future for similar reasons. 
13. IS THERE INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT OVER GOALS OR OBJECTIVES? 
Volatile: self-binding strategic move is possible outcome. 
14. DOES C USE ADAPTIVE PLANNING? (Ackoff, 1988) 
Role play, reconstruct data etc. 
15. WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS OF C's USE OF (a) SPECIFIC COGNITIVE HEURISTICS 
(e.g; AVAILABILITY, REPRESENTIVENESS, ANCHORING) and (b) HEURISTIC 
PLANNING GUIDES.? Consider how these could effect C's judgements 
and probability estimates (cf. Schwenk, 1984). 
16. WHAT ARE C's CAPABILITIES? 
These limit strategic possibilities. 
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17. WHAT IS C'S ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE? 
Can be used to prescribe strategy (cf. Oral, 1987) 
18. DOES C USE "PARE" ANALYSIS. ie.ASSESSING POTENTIAL, RESILIENCE? 
Replicate the analysis (cf. Derkenderen & Crum, 1979). 
19. HOW STRONG IS C'S STRATEGIC MOMENTUM (STATUS-QUO PREFERENCE)? 
When will C "throw good money after bad"? 
(c) Competitor's goals. motivations (ends rationalities) 
20. WHAT ARE C'S STATED GOALS OR OBJECTIVES? 
Any implications for likely strategy? 
21. WHAT GOALS ARE IMPLICIT IN C's ACTIONS? 
Current goals might reflect past actions 
22. ARE THESE GOALS WELL-CHOSEN, SUITABLE? 
If not expect poor performance. 
23. CAN C's (a) CURRENT ACTUAL GOALS, (b) STRATEGIC VISION, BE INFERRED 
FROM C's PAST BEHAVIOURS, PATTERNS, AND STATEMENTS? 
These are likely to be the actual rather than stated goals 
24. WHAT IS C's INTERNAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURE? 
Performance measures for divisions? Stock options? etc. 
25. DOES C BALANCE SHAREHOLDER VALUE-CREATION AGAINST STAKEHOLDER 
INTERESTS? IN (i) ACTIONS, (ii) STATEMENTS, AND (iii) JUSTIFICATIONS? 
This could be a stable property of the organisation. 
26. DOES C HAVE AN IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT, "HOT SPOT", OR MISSION 
ego involving specific stakeholders. 
27. BY WHAT PROCESS OR PROCEDURE DOES C FORMULATE GOALS? 
If consultative process (like ringi) expect stronger commitments. 
28. HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE DOES C APPEAR TO ATTACH TO THIS PROCESS OF GOAL-
FORMULATION? 
If high then expect better performance, realisation of potential. 
(d) Competencies: Practical. Expressive, Systemic rationalities. 
29. IS C COMPETETENT AT IMPLEMENTATION, "SPIRALLING"? 
Expect closer correspondence between intended, realised strategies 
30. DOES C HAVE INTERNAL PROGRAMMES OF CAPABILITY-DEVELOPMENT, IN VARIOUS 
FUNCTIONAL AREAS? 
Expect improved perfromance. 
31. IS C SKILLED AT MATCHING CAPABILTIES TO STRATEGIES? 
Expect continued good strategic "fit". 
32. DOES C HAVE A CORPORATE (or BRAND) (i) IDENTITY? (ii) REPUTATION 
( iii) NICHE? 
If so will probably fiercely defend these, e.g. in takeovers. 
33. DO C's PAST MOVES HAVE SYMBOLIC VALUE, REINFORCING IDENTITY? 
Expect more of the same. 
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34. DOES C MAINTAIN TRADITIONS? 
Expect strong influence on policy, strategy 
35. HOW SIMILAR IS THE PAST AND CURRENT CONTEXT, FOR TRIGGERING THE 
TRADITIONAL RESPONSES? 
If similar, expect traditional (possibly weak) strategy. 
(e) Competitor's ethical policies. 
36. DOES C USE (i) SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, (ii) UTILITARIAN PUBLIC 
JUSTICATIONS? . 
Expect some stability to these practices, policies 
37. IS THERE A RECORD OR POLICY EMPHASISING FAIRNESS IN THE TREATMENT OF 
STAKEHOLDERS. 
Expect some stability to these practices, policies. 
38. DOES C RECOGNISE STRATEGIC DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS? HOW ARE THESE 
INTERPRETED? 
e.g., to stakeholders, governental agencies, overseas entities, etc. 
(f) Competitor Analysis and Interactive Rationality 
39. IS THERE A PATTERN OVER TIME IN C's ACTIONS OR DECISIONS? 
Extrapolate the pattern 
40. HOW DOES (ANALYST'S) OWN SITUATION EFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF C? 
WHAT ARE (ANALYST'S) BIASES? 
Reflect, introspect on analyst's possible biases, motives etc. 
In SCIO-COMP, the actual strategic behaviour of organisations is 
identified with the behaviour that one would prescribe and expect from any 
plurally-rational agent. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, there is 
nothing fundamentally wrong with viewing an organisation as a rational-agent, 
so long as the relevant forms of rationality are themselves carefully 
specified (refer to chapters two and three). The view of the organisation or 
strategic entity as a plurally-rational agent is, in a sense, rather 
optimistic. Where others have seen only chaos and garbage-cans in the 
organisational decision process, SCIO-COMP sees many useful parallels between 
what is and what ought to be in the domain of the strategic behavior of 
firms. 
4. CORPORATE POTENTIAL & THE ICM. 
Some of the questions posed in Table 1, above, make reference to the 
concepts of organisational capabilities, or the potential performance of the 
firm. Traditionally, these concepts have belonged in the psychological 
domain; however, their importance to general economic and competitive 
analysis has now become quite widely recognised (e. g. Leibenstein, 1978; 
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Hargreaves Heap, 1989; Oral, 1986). The philosophical basis for emphasising 
"potential" in strategic planning ultimately lies in the idea that rational 
agents have a duty to develop their own talents (whatever these may be) to 
the highest possible level ... and to put them to good use. This idea appears 
in many of the strands that have at times been woven into the overall fabric 
of plural rat~onality, including ethical, expressive, selective and systemic 
forms. 
The earliest reported attempt to operationalise the concept of potential 
achievement, in the context of organisational strategy may be found in the 
"Brain of the Firm" (Beer, 1972). Derkenderen and Crum (1979) subsequently 
devised the strategic investment analysis technique of Potential and 
Resilience Evaluation (PARE). where a firms unrealised potential and its 
ability to cope with adversity are taken as key determinates of its economic 
value. However, neither of these early approaches extended to the 
competitive environment. The International Competitiveness Model (lCM) 
developed by Professor Muhittin Oral has enabled some significant progress in 
this respect COral, 1986). The ICM and the accompanying methodology of 
competi tive strategic analysis involves quantification of the actual and 
potential performance of the firm and its specified competitor(s). 
When using the ICM for strategic analysis it is necessary to measure or 
estimate numerous parameters relating to the "host" organisation as well as 
the target competitor. These parameters cover manufacturing, marketing, 
financial, organisational and macro-environmental factors. Parameter values 
may then be used in an algorithm to yield prescriptions for competitive 
strategy (e.g., Oral, Singer and Kettani, 1990). The ICM satisfies all of 
the six screening criteria for models of competition, discussed in section 2 
of this chapter. Like SCIQ-1, the ICM is a rather holistic approach to 
analysing the strategic problem of the firm. It has also served as an 
excellent framework for sourcing and collating competitive intelligence in a 
quantitative form, identifying strengths and weaknesses of the firm and its 
competitors, as well as a basis for a decision-support-system (Oral, 1987). 
1. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out one approach to screening and evaluating 
competitive analysis techniques, and then introduced a variant of SCIO 
specifically oriented to competitor analysis. With conventional techniques, 
strategic analysts often myopically attend to only a subset of the issues 
that have normative importance for competitive strategic interactions, as 
prescribed within a framework of plural rationality. Many of these issues 
can now be more readily identified by using the SCIO-COMP technique. 
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Alternative prescriptive methodologies, like the ICM, could also be used 
in conjunction with SCIO-COMP. At the very least, multiple quantitative 
and qualitative techniques should be used routinely in competitive analysis; 
but these should also, at the same time, be coupled to a good understanding 
of their specified limitations. Finally. since all concepts of rationality 
are of limited power (e. g., Levi, 1986; Rescher, 1988) the intelligence 
analyst should always expect to encounter at least some unresolved and 
unresolvable mysteries in business competitor analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MET A-THEORIES AND CAPITAL BUDGETING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous surveys of the use of capital budgeting techniques have reported 
the difficulties experienced by managers attempting to incorporate strategic 
considerations into financial analysis. For example Marsh et al (1989) 
reported that managers using DCF analysis were sometimes asked to "ignore the 
numbers (in their analysis) and express the strategy in words". More 
recently, Pike (1991 p243) reported "only moderate progress" in overcoming 
various practical problems with capital budgeting techniques, although these 
have been recognised "over the last two decades". 
About one decade ago, this recognition motivated some tentative 
explorations of the finance-strategy interface (e.g. Bowman, 1980; Pinches, 
1982; Bettis, 1983; Myers, 1984). Subsequent research has followed two 
distinct paths, in the search for a finance-strategy synthesis and a better 
understanding of strategic investment decisions (SIDs). One path has led to 
refinements of capital budgeting methodologies, in order to assimilate 
strategic considerations (e.g. McDonald et al, 1986; Dyl et al, 1987; 
Jensen, 1987; Myers, 1988; West et al 1989; Pike 1991, to mention a few). 
"Assimilation" is used here in the Piagetian sense, meaning that the basic 
cogni ti ve schema of researchers remains stable, but it is adjusted to cope 
with new experiences. In Lakatosian terminology, the core paradigm of capital 
budgeting has been retained in Path 1, but it is changed incrementally in 
response to evidence, experiences of failure, or a sense that it is 
incomplete. An alternative path, Path 2, has been trodden more heavily in 
planning, modelling and decision-research (Wensley, 1981; Oral, 1986; Mehrez 
et al, 1989). This path seeks a more radical accomodation, a change in the 
basic cognitive schema, or a revolutionary paradigm-shift in prescribing 
strategic investments. 
Path 2 seeks out new ways of incorporating the full range of strategic 
issues into the investment decision process. It seeks alternative non-DCF 
methodologies for strategic investment decisions (SIDs). At the same time, 
applications of DCF are confined to different types of non-strategic 
investment decision. The present chapter treads the second path, but it is 
quite innovative in drawing together several previously isolated 
meta-theories (i.e. theories about the use and effectiveness of other 
theories) and tracing their combined implications for the rational use of DCF 
. methodologies. 
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STRATEGIC 
ISSUES ... 
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In the following section, five meta-theories of capital budgeting are 
identified within the MS-OR, strategic-planning, forecasting, rationality and 
finance literatures. These meta-theories are quite independent, having few 
mutual citations, but they are also convergent, in the sense of having 
similar conclusions. In combination with one another, these meta-theories 
identify contexts for rational applications of DCF, some unorthodox roles for 
DCF analysis in the organisational strategy process, as well as some specific 
limitations of DCF methodologies. 
It has been suggested before that DCF-use could "sometimes be irrational" 
(Brunsson, 1990). The convergent meta-theories now sharpen that critique by 
qui te clearly identifying decision-contexts and decision-states which are 
sui ted to DCF analysis. These are discussed further in section 3, below, 
where a distinction is made between the following three types of decision: 
TYPE 1 : "investment versus some other non-investment strategy, like 
cost reduction. 
TYPE 2 : selection of assets from a set of technologically similar 
assets having known performance parameters, and 
TYPE 3 financial decisions, such as choices amongst leases. 
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3. Meta-forecasting: This has explored the perceived and actual reliability 
of quantitative model-based forecasts (Makridakis, 1988). One major 
finding is that best-fit models of historic data are very unreliable for 
forecasting volatile parameters like sales or costs of a firm. Such 
forecasts must be distinguished from others, like actuarial projections, 
that are based on quite deeply understood systemic processes. A related 
stream of research has explored judgemental adjustments and subjective 
interventions in formal sales forecasting models, that seek to capture 
(Le. assimilate) strategic information (West et ai, 1989). However, 
there is still no evidence that the resulting methodologies actually do 
produce reliable forecasts. Several behavioural and philosphical 
perspectives, discussed subsequently in sections 3 & 4 reveal fundamental 
limitations on forecasting and probability-estimation in socio-economic 
systems (Doktor et ai, 1988; MacIntyre, 1984; Singer et ai, 1984; Einhorn 
et al 1982). 
4. Meta-rationality: 
rationality, apart 
This 
from 
concerns the many alternative 
rational-utility-maximisation, 
forms of 
and their 
inter-relationships. The general theory of rational decisions spans many 
of the contemporary social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, 
philosophy) where numerous (more than 35) distinctive forms of 
rationali ty have now been defined and analysed. Taken together, these 
comprise a set, IR of plural rationality, as set out in chapter two 
(Singer 1992). This is discussed further, in relation to DCF use, in 
section 3 of the present chapter. 
5. Finally, one must not, of course, forget the meta-OCF paradigm itself. 
This has focussed solely on the use (and abuse) of capital budgeting 
techniques, like DCF and sensitivity-analysis. The extent of their use 
(Klammer et ai, 1984; Pike, 1988) and the problems encountered have all 
been well-documented (Marsh et ai, 1988; Pike et ai, 1991). Meta-DCF 
research simply confirms what meta-forecasting tells us: that forecasts 
of cashflows for applications of DCF constitute a "barrier" to effective 
use of the techniques, they are "extremely difficult" (Marsh et ai, 1988) 
"impossible" (Crum et ai, 1986), "inadequate" (Pruitt et ai, 1987), or 
else "unreliable" when produced in a controlled experiment (Ang, et ai, 
1979). These "problems" of usage may now be considered in relation to the 
classification of problem-types or decision-domains (i.e. 
STRATEGIC versus OTHERS) set out earlier in chapter four. 
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2.1 Convergent findings 
The five meta-theories are contemporaries of each other, but so far, they 
have run in parallel, hardly ever crossing each others paths. For example, 
there are suprisingly few mutual citations in the various literatures. It is 
now becoming quite obvious that the various streams have reached a point of 
confluence, where their common findings and conclusions are mutually 
reinforcing. Moroever, the earlier independence of the research streams can 
only enhance the credibility of their common findings. Essentially the same 
message is now audible, from many independent sources. One major finding, 
discussed earlier in chapter four (Table 2.) concerns the many unorthodox 
roles of DCF techniques (ritual, glue, etc.). A second major finding, also 
discussed in chapter four and developed further here, concerns the need to 
classify decision problems for selection of sui table solution methods and 
procedures. 
(i) Classifying decisions 
The meta-theories classify decisions, probems, and contexts as follows: 
1. In meta-modelling, the classifications are as set out in Table 1 of 
chapter four (L e. UNPROGRAMMED versus PROGRAMMED, etc.). In addi tion, 
the established distinction betwen "strategic and "other" types of decision 
is once again echoed in contemporary developments in the field of strategic 
decision support systems, where reseaRchers have distinguished between 
MINTS, or intelligent systems versus MIS, or information systems (Finlay, 
1989). The former involve knowledge structures whilst the latter are 
essentally little more than spreadsheets. In this context, Wensley (1981) 
has also contrasted the "BOXES & BASICS" of strategic analysis 
(ccorresponding with MINTS) with the BETAS of model-based financial analysis 
(Le. MIS). 
2. In addition to these distinctions drawn from the meta-modelling 
1i terature, another stream of l1eta-planning research has also classified 
problems as: 
UNSTRUCTURED versus STRUCTURED (Mintzberg, et al 1976) 
STRATEGIC versus TACTICAL (Quinn, 1980) 
INTUITIVE versus ANALYTIC (Singer, 1981) 
INCREMENTAL versus FORMAL (Quinn 1982) 
INDUCTIVE versus DEDUCTIVE (Nonaka, 1988). ... 
3. . .. and l1eta-forecasting has similarly characterised forecasting-contexts 
as: 
UNFORECASTABLE versus FORECASTABLE (MacIntyre, 1984) 
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4. Corresponding to these distinctions are the many partitions of the set ~ 
of the plural rationaities, such as: 
SYSTEMIC versus CALCULATED (Marsh, 1978) 
PROCEDURAL versus SUBSTANTIVE (Simon, 1987) 
IMPERFECT versus PERFECT (Hamlin, 1986) 
COGNITIVE versus INSTRUMENTAL (Walliser, 1989) 
CONTEXTUAL versus INSTRUMENTAL (White, 1989) 
FIGURE 2. 
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5. However, the fifth meta-theory, of OCF itself, within the Accounting & 
Finance disciplines, is the only one that has so far NOT set out any explicit 
classification of decision-types. Instead, in this research paradigm, all 
types of investment decision have been interpreted strictly wi thin the 
framework of the formal capital market theory. Put differently, within the 
mainstream Accounting & Finance literatures, the fundamental nature of the 
challenge posed by the convergent meta-theories has hardly ever been 
acknowledged (One exception: Bromley et al 1986). Despite the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence, it is still being argued that the "difficulties" with 
DCF use could be overcome through various technical REFINEMENTS or extensions 
of the methodology. In terms of Figure 1, PATH 1 has been chosen in 
mainstream Accounting & Finance. Despite the forecasting problem and the 
complexi ties and incompleteness of the underlying meta rational arguments 
(chapters one & four), this traditional paradigm still insists on a path of 
assimilating 
H e IMNORM 
strategic 
with »( H 
considerations into financial-economic 
as rational-utility-maximisation (RUM). 
models 
For example, it has been proposed that cashflow forecasts for DCF 
calcula tion should be adjusted to allow for competitor's reactions (Myers, 
1988; Dyl & Hofmeister, 1987), that stochastic inter-dependencies of discount 
rates and other parameters should be formally modelled over the planning 
period (R. Jensen, 1987), that stakeholder's needs and reactions should be 
assimilated into a financial decision model (Cornell et ai, 1987) and that 
calculated NPVs should include the value of delay, or waiting to invest 
(McDonald et ai, 1986). In addition, strategic applications of DCF-CAPM 
(Naylor et ai, 1982) seek to evaluate strategic investments relative to a 
pattern of forecast asset and market returns. These proposed refinements 
and extensions of basic DCF techniques for SIDs, all fly directly in the face 
of the convergent meta-theories of modelling, planning, forecasting, as well 
as rationality itself (Figure 2). In terms of the arguments set out earlier 
in chapter four, difficulty could be traced to the orientation within the 
Accounting-Finance paradigm towards applying RUM-based models to investment 
decisions by the strategic entity itself, as distinct from prescriptons at 
the aggregate, systemic or public-policy level. 
3. THE META-THEORY OF OCF. 
There is a direct correspondence between the specific limits of DCF 
analysis, 
limits of 
recognised in the convergent meta-theories, 
strong-instumental rationality relative to 
and the distinctive 
alternative forms, 
recognised in the general theory of rationality. This correspondence is set 
out in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. ocr-LIMITATIONS ANO ALTERNATIVE RATIONALITIES. 
OCF lim! tations Alternatives to RUM E IR Refer Chapter(s) 
Unpredictability bounded, minimal One, Two 
Goals & Values value-rationalities Three 
Histories backward-looking forms Four 
Competi tion strategic-beliefs Five 
Potentiali ty selected, expressive, open Five 
Taken together, the various meta-theories (modelling, planning, 
forecasting, rationality) and the developments set out in the earlier 
chapters now point to a new meta-theory of capital budgeting. The 
long-standing and well-documented "problems" encountered with practical 
applications of the traditional capital budgeting techniques may now be quite 
easily resolved at the level of this meta-theory, essentially by CONFINING 
the use of a variant of DCF to suitable contexts, rather than by REFINING 
the methodology itself. In this regard, it has been argued elswhere that 
organisations must "often be. advised not to use" techniques like DCF, or that 
their use could "sometimes be irrational" (Meyer, 1990; Brunsson, 1990). The 
convergent meta-theories elaborate upon the terms "often" and "sometimes", 
making it possible to describe the contexts or problem-domains for rational 
versus irrational applications of DCF. 
3.1. Specifying Contexts 
For contexts which are "unclear, unstructured. unprogrammable, 
unforecastable, ambiguous, primary, strategic conundrums", DCF-analysis can 
only function as set out in Table 2 of chapter four, as a ritual, 
status-symbol, or a bargaining framework, etc. TYPE 1 SIDs generally answer 
this description, so that using DCF in those contexts now amounts to an 
irrational disregard for the limitations and convergent meta-theories 
discussed earlier. Put differently, in terms of the formal definition of a 
"meta-theory" offered in section 2 and illustrated in Figure 2, the 
set-theoretic intersection of the various meta-theories contains the simple 
proposition: m 
ex 
: "Do not apply DCF to TYPE 1 decisions." In these TYPE 1 
decision-contexts or problem-domains, alternative techniques and plural 
rationalities are now needed (e.g. Singer 1992a; Van Gigch, 1991). 
On the other hand, secondary decision problems such as optimal asset 
selection and optimal financing are somet imes "clear, structured, 
forecastable puzzles" and therefore present good opportunties for 
(strong-instrumental, calculated) rational applications of DCF. These TYPE 2 
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& TYPE 3 contexts occur after the strategy process and after alternative 
techniques of strategic analysis have led the firm towards a strategy 
(Figure 3) involving investment in some class of capital asset, fA. Put 
differently, the meta-theories all contain the proposition 
should sometimes be applied to TYPE 2 & TYPE 3 decisions." 
FIGURE 3. THE RATIONAL USE OF nCF 
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In secondary contexts, rational selection or choices can sometimes be 
made from amongst a set of specified capital assets fA ::: {a, a
2
, ,a } 
1 1 
having known performance characteristics and similar technologies. To 
illustrate, consider the case of a firm producing and marketing a highly 
differentiated product, but where sales are constrained only by the firm's 
manufacturing capacity. After a long period of deliberation, the strategy 
process has converged onto a decision to expand plant capacity (this 
accurately decribes the case of Morgan Cars Ltd. in the U. K. , 
1980' s). 
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in the 
L 
• ,If 
Suppose, now, that there are two or more suppliers of technologically 
similar plant having different capacities and different prices. The 
objects-of-choice in this "investment decision" are now (perhaps literally) 
concrete. It is a simple asset selection decision, a programmable puzzle. 
Use of DCF to select the particular asset, a E ~, is now quite rational. 
J 
The same applies to some types of financing decision. However, in these 
secondary contexts or decision-domains, the DCF decision rules and 
prescriptions must be reformulated, as set out below. 
3.2. Modified DCF decision-rules 
Within the context of investment decisions as secondary TYPE 2 puzzles, 
having a positive versus negative NPV for the assets a
1
, a
2 
, ... , a
l 
is no 
longer particularly relevant. In these contexts, the decision to invest has 
already been taken, via a more holistic, incremental, human, primary process 
(that may also involve use of other models and techniques). The strategy 
processes in the primary phase, leading up to a decision: "invest in some a E 
~" would normally take into account such factors as goal-conflict, 
competition, portfolio synergies, future technological changes, strategic 
timing and risks, etc. A calculated NPV < 0, which cannot adequately 
incorporate these factors, should not then be used (in the role of pliers) 
to force a revision of an emergent TYPE 3 investment strategy. 
Instead, if relevant parameter values are known, one should simply use 
DCF to select a dominating asset a E ~ 1. e. the one with the highest 
calculated NPV. Therefore, in this type of application, the rational NPV 
decision-rule simply becomes: 
Select a where: 
J 
NPV [a.l = MAX { NPV [a] } 
.J 1 
5.3. Financing decisions. 
The meta-theory prescribes a similar DCF decision-rule for some types of 
secondary financing decision, for example choosing between well-specified 
leasing opportunities: 
IL = {L 
1 
L 
2 
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L } 
p 
The rational decision rule is then simply 
Choose where: = MIN { PV [L ] } 
I 
This decision-rule uses DCF calculations to eliminate dominated financing 
alternatives for a proposed strategic investment. If these decisions are 
combined, in a framework that sees each asset-selection-with-
financing-alternative as a discrete package, with a choice amongst the 
distrete objects: 
[at' L I, J 
with i = 1.2, .. ,1. and j = 1,2 •.. ,PI 
the combined decision rule is then simply: 
Choose MAX { PV [a , L ]} 
ii, J 
I,J 
4. CONCLUSION 
If DCF analysis is adapted in this way for TYPE 2 & TYPE 3 investment 
decisions, but finally abandoned for TYPE 1 SID's, the way is then open for 
alternative prescriptive methodologies of strategic investment analysis 
(i. e. PATH 1 in Figure 1). The convergent meta-theories then confirm that 
such methodologies should have plural and varied decision- function-
rationalities. This has, in fact, been implicitly assumed by researchers in 
the field of strategic-decision-making throughout more than two decades (e.g. 
Rosenhead, 1989) but it has now been made quite explicit in the preceding 
chapters. In contrast to the plural decision function rationalities of the 
various alternative methodologies. the use of DCF involves an implicit choice 
of just one. rather narrow form of rationality (i.e. RUM) as the basis for 
deciding whether the firm should invest. 
The many empirical studies of the use of capital budgeting techniques in 
organizations have all reported characteristic technical errors of 
application, such as mis-specification of the discount rate. failure to 
consider incremental cashflows relative to a next-best alternative, 
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overlooking or deliberately ignoring the valuation effects of capital 
structure changes, etc. (e.g. Marsh et ai, 1989). However, these "errors" 
are now seen to be of qui te minor importance when compared to the more 
serious meta-theoretic error of applying the OCF methodology to the wrong 
TYPE of investment decision, or in the wrong problem domain .. 
For TYPE 1 SIOs, which are unforecastable, ambiguous etc., the 
positive-NPV decision rule should not be used, for the various reasons 
outlined and elaborated upon throughout chapters one to six. For TYPE 2 & 
TYPE 3 asset-selection and financing choices, it is sometimes rational, in 
the relevant strong-instrumental sense, to use OCF analysis simply to 
maximise the calculated NPVs for the available known asset-&-financing 
packages The meta-theoretic solution to the various "difficulties" and 
"problems" experienced with OCF is therefore one of confinement of OCF, 
together with an accomodation or paradigm-shift towards further development 
of new prescriptive methodologies for SIDs, such as ICM (Oral, 1987, Oral et 
ai, 1989), SCIO and its variants, etc. Heta-rational arguments, 
particularly, tell us that a refined OCF will never succeed in assimilating 
the full range of key strategic issues like reputation, identity, 
potentiality, co-ordination and stability into probabilistic (conditional) 
forecasts of the firm's key financial parameters. In terms of the broad 
identification of strategy heuristics as "boxes" and the ever advancing uses 
of "intelligent" support systems, one might now elaborate upon the natural 
language propositions of the convergent meta-theories to say that "HIS will 
never get BETA with new HINTS and BOXES". 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It would be easy, rather too easy, to reiterate here the major points of 
each chapter. Instead, this brief concluding section now attempts to do 
exactly the opposite and to challenge them. One cannot easily take a 
position like that taken in this thesis, without at the same time becoming a 
target of opposing forces. Fortunately, these have been placated, if not 
entirely overcome. I would, however, pay some respects by setting out 
reasons why the various positions taken in each of chapers one to six might, 
after all, be wrong. 
1. The opening chapter explored the relationship between finance and 
strategy in terms of formal models M E ~, their decision-function 
rationalities »(.) and various meta-rational relationships. This approach 
has indeed succeded in drawing attention to several theoretical relationships 
that were often ignored or de-emphasised in the earlier strategy literature. 
However, it may now also be appropriate to draw attention to the simple point 
that not all conflicting model-based prescriptions for SID's can be re-cast 
in this way. Some particular alternative models, for example ENPV, CAPM 
of course, have »(ENPV) = »(CAPM) (= RUM) yet still yield quite 
different prescriptions, even when model-parameters are evaluated with 
reference to the same data sets (of probabilities, forecast returns, etc.). 
In addition, the same model Mk could also yield conflicting prescriptions 
for SID's simply by estimating the model's parameters in different ways. 
Thus, the conceptual framework in chapter one does not tell the whole story 
of conflicting model-based prescriptions, it is simply the less obvious part. 
2. The isomorphism :::s (.) set out in "Strategy as rationality", with 
the associated identification of the strategic entity as a plurally rational 
agent has led to new concepts like optimal strategy, expressive strategy and 
not-for-profit strategic committments, together with variants of the scra 
technique. The core insight in this chapter was that "The language and 
conceptual foundations of strategic management theory very closely parallel 
those of the plural rationalities. This is surely no coincidence;" 
Although others have explicitly or implicitly assumed forms of rationality 
when they have formulated their particular theory of strategy (e.g. 
Leibenstein's Theory of X-efficiency, Thompson's Organisations in Action, 
Williamson's Markets and Hierachies) , some have made out a contrary case: for 
"Strategy as irrationality" Examples of the latter include De Vries & 
Miller's "neurotic styles" , or Argyris' "defensive routines". These are 
just some of the possible rejoinders one might expect to the question: 
"Strategy IS rationality .... what else could it be?". Perhaps, on reflection 
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(as prompted by one anonymous reviewer) that question might better have been 
posed as: "What else could it have been?". If, in the early development of 
strategic management theory, researchers had stuck to the view that people 
are social (not rational) actors, whose cognitive processes and motivations 
are determined primarily by social and emotional systems, then the 
contemporary theory of organizational strategy would then have turned out 
very differently. Since the "social actor" paradigm has not, in fact, 
dominated, most (but admittedly not all) theories of strategy are indeed now 
theories of and about rationality. 
3. As meta-rational arguments converge towards meta-ethical theory, the 
conceptual framework of "Strategy as rationality" inevitably projects itself 
into the domain of business ethics, carrying with it associated problems of 
corporate moral agency. This extended framework now links strategy with 
ethics. It explains, in one sweep, concepts like "congruence", "parallism" 
and "reverse logic", whilst it also complements the re-integration at the 
systemic level of Economics with Ethics. However, as compared with 
"Strategy as Rationality", the flat statement that "Strategy is Ethics" is 
even more provocative. Of course, not all theories of moral behaviour are 
necessarily grounded in the assumption that man is primarily rational. For 
example, Etzioni has recently offered us a quite lengthy (94 page) 
explanation of why individual morality and individual rationality might not 
be the same. Instead, as he implied, some of us go to great lengths (i. e 
beyond what he considers as "rational" criteria) to fulfill what we ourselves 
construe as moral imperatives. I would simply note that once again, this 
description applies with equal force to collectives and organizations. 
4. In chapter four, the emerging theory of strategy is applied to the 
enigmatic sunk-cost context. Past investments deform (to use a term 
suggested by Milan Zeleny) the environment of the strategic-entity and these 
historical deformations are then seen, within. the extended normative theory, 
as boiling down to just a few sunk-cast-factors like reputation, or 
contractual obligations. All existing normative and decsriptive accounts 
then seem to underestimate the scope of the general meta-rational linkages 
between the backward-looking rationalities and their more familiar 
foward-looking counterparts. These linkages span some vexed problems of 
optimality, co-ordination, stability, attention and description. 
Accordingly, chapter four formulated a "generic sunk cost problem" as 
confronted by all plurally rational agents. Is this a correct formulation of 
the strategic problem? It could perhaps be argued instead that all strategic 
entities have some past history, so that all problems of strategy are, in 
fact, problems of "strategy-with-sunk-costs". 
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5. "Strategic 
perspectives from 
intelligence and plural 
participant to observer. 
rationali ty" then switched 
Strategic interactions in the 
real world of many plurally-rational-agents are not, in general, explicable 
nor predictable with reference to RUM-based models alone, nor even by using 
models of interacting bounded agents. Instead dynamic interactions occur 
between plurally rational agents, each of which operates in a 
multidimensional world of attentional limitations, multiple goals, 
constrained autonomy and rational-ethical concern! This rich imagery now 
points us towards some possible future theory of Ultra-games (cf. Howard's 
Meta-games and Bennett's Hyper-games), in which players (individuals, groups, 
corporations, networks, etc.) achieve a co-existence in a state of partial 
awareness, partial satisfaction and partial moral-fulfillment (as distinct 
from partial equilbrium). Although the rather Herculean task of working out 
the details of such a prospective theory of "Ultra-games" may have to be 
delegated upwards (to the deities) the associated SCIO-COMP technique of 
business competitor analysis is very down-to-earth: as a mere participant in 
(rather than observer of, or creator of) the real Ultra-game of strategic 
interaction, one strategic-entity could simply attend, systematically, to 
the multiple-rationalities of the other(s). 
6. The final chapter then briefly revisited the opening theme. It has 
become embarassingly obvious that traditional finance-theoretic models need 
some radical re-thinking, if they are going to yield workable techniques for 
management. The simple classification of investment-problem-types, in the 
final chapter, with the suggested modified DCF decision-rules, now offers but 
one possible way in which proponents of forecast-based models like DCF could 
respond productively to the many convergent meta-theories. Alternative 
techniques like SCIO, or other new paradigms of strategy research like 
those of Zeleny, Sutherland, et ai, each now offers new ways of improving 
the rationality of strategic decisions, in one sense or another. 
Accordingly, it seems quite safe to make a qualitative prediction at this 
point : rationality and ethics will very likely continue to inform strategy, 
and vice versa. 
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